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Preface 
 
This thesis has defined my senior year of Pomona College.  When I chose to write about 
Colombia’s armed conflict I did not know the extent to which I would become attached, 
detached, hopeless, hopeful, frustrated, and encouraged by what I would learn.  And this 
was not just because the International Relations thesis is a monster.  The topic itself is 
taxing, academically and emotionally.  
 
At the beginning of last semester I knew with certainty I wanted to write my thesis on the 
post-conflict in Colombia.  Peace negotiations in Havana between the Colombian state 
and the country’s largest guerrilla group were aiming to close the chapter of half a decade 
of civil war.  This was a pressing topic of peacebuilding and security studies.  This is the 
conflict that had been etched in my earliest memories. This is the conflict that follows 
anyone who was born in Colombia regardless of where they go, regardless of whether 
they have spent the majority of their lives elsewhere…I felt this was my conflict.   
 
My parents were suffocating under the weight of one of Colombia’s most violent periods.  
They were anxious, nervous, frightened, and worried about their young daughters’ future 
in a country where entire villages were annihilated by armed groups and kidnapping 
reports were common news.  They wanted to leave before we would be part of the next 
body count in the usual kidnapping report on the news.  My parents wanted their 
daughters to have another view of the world, to have the opportunity to see something 
different, and live a reality unstained by violence.  
 
I had kept my happy early childhood memories and pushed aside the ones I didn't quite 
understand, or rather didn’t want to understand—what would be the use, anyway?  
Violence would always be present and the news would always be filled with massacres, 
kidnappings, FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, cocaine, etc.  Colombia was a paradise that 
always held an allure for me because of its beauty and my loving family.  It was the 
memory of the people, landscapes, culture, and contagious vibrancy that I kept in my 
heart growing up in the States.    
 
When I started the research for my thesis in September, I was ravenous for information 
and any time that I could spend finding more information on my topic.  I was excited for 
the climactic academic journey of a two-semester capstone thesis project that my 
International Relations professors had promised.  The history of the nation, the history of 
the conflict and of the post-conflict, the different attempts at peace, the bloody 
narcotrafficking, the scholarship on conflict resolution—I was determined to learn as 
much as I could and make my thesis the best I could.  On September 23rd, the 
Government of Colombia announced that in six months they would sign the peace 
agreement with the FARC.   
 
I knew of the violence and of the displaced victims: I recall seeing entire campesino 
families on the streets of Bogota begging for money, destitute, as they had managed to 
escape but only with their lives from yet another attack by the guerrilla.  Hearing the 
personal narratives in my head at this age, not blinded by childhood, was different 
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however.  Reading The Heart of the War by Constanza Ardila Galvis was the first dagger 
that pierced my reality, my identity, and my image of Colombia.  The narratives were 
devastating.  My blood was just as Colombian as the people in the book, yet I seemed so 
far removed and that pained me.  Inevitably, I questioned my own Colombianness.   
 
~~~ 
 
When I was first developing my thesis, I intended to work on a plan that included an 
overarching view of DDR, a three-pronged post-conflict strategy of Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration that is intended for security and stability and in a post-
conflict environment to transition to an eventual peace.  Although I was thinking about 
DDR in its entirety, I was focusing on the Reintegration aspect, or the process of re-
establishing ex-combatants in civilian life—the weakest link and perhaps the most 
important and complicated one as it involves the entire society.  Because of this, I 
thought that perhaps I should concentrate my efforts on just this facet of DDR.  To be 
honest, I was not really looking too intensively into the disarmament and demobilization 
aspects.  I was becoming more interested in the “what next?” question, in the post-
conflict aspect that would be so integral in determining the nation’s future—would this 
conflict last for another 20, 30, 50 years because of yet another inadequate agreement and 
the impossibility of conciliating the multiple interests into the one and only legitimate 
goal of peace?   
 
Over winter break, I had the opportunity to travel to Colombia to conduct research for my 
thesis.  I quickly understood the extent of the polarization within the different levels of 
society.  It felt raw and tangible.  Whenever I talked to anyone there were two subjects on 
the table:  a fiasco involving a Colombian mistakenly crowned and then hastily 
uncrowned Miss Universe, and the peace process.  People were highly vocal about both.  
Either you believed in the peace process or you didn’t, and those who said “Yo? Yo no 
creo en la paz…no me hablen de eso” puzzled me the most.  When I mentioned my 
overarching thesis theme of post-conflict and DDR, people were either impressed by my 
audacity and probable academic rigor for addressing such a topic, or they looked at me 
with a look that said, “Pobrecita, no sabe en lo que se mete” and commented how it was 
an immensely complex and undecipherable topic.  When I talked about the fact that I 
would be focusing on the reintegration of ex-combatants, someone even told me how I 
had chosen the wrong side and how instead I should be focusing on the victims, a much 
more approachable topic.  Regardless of people’s opinions, the talk of peace was 
everywhere.  Even in the movies.  Before the movie trailers started, a commercial talking 
about the progress being made in Havana was played.   
 
I learned so much by being in the country and talking to various people—I felt the 
turmoil, as well as the frustration of the citizens at not being part of the process and 
feeling alienated by the government.  I also found widespread pessimism.  Having 
traveled to Colombia motivated me to write the rest of my thesis this second semester, as 
I was able to grasp a sense of the everyday situation of civilians in the midst of this latest 
attempt at peace reconciliation.  I realized the need for all segments of society to have a 
mindset for peace and a willingness to cooperate with this latest attempt.  This latest 
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project would not come to a successful fruition lest all the different segments, including 
the state, the military, the victims, the receiving society, and the ex-combatants, chose to 
give some ground in order to reach a real settlement.  I do not mean having the same 
perspective, but having the same goal of progressing to a state that could see an eventual 
peace.    
 
Second semester came and I continued to work on my thesis, more mechanically, more 
stressed, and more exhausted than at the beginning of my journey, but with the impulse 
from my experience in Colombia.  I was not just writing about theory, I was writing 
about the people I met.  I was writing about that victim I serendipitously met in the 
elevator, who so graciously shared with me her story as a union member displaced by 
violence, looking for reparations in Bogota.  I questioned the theoretical articles I had 
previously read because even though the policies for helping victims and ex-combatants 
seemed well developed on paper, in reality the red tape and incompetence in their 
execution was not accommodating to the people it claimed to help.    
 
While I was getting closer to the deadline for completing my thesis, Colombia was 
getting closer to the deadline for completing peace negotiations on March 23rd that would 
end the conflict with the FARC.  I had to write a chapter that tied the current events 
behind the politics of peacemaking to post-conflict.  So much was happening in 
Colombia.  Every day I engulfed Colombian news from El Tiempo, El Espectador, 
Semana, etc.  Excited at first at the momentum of the situation, I quickly became drained.  
Colombia’s news during these first few months of 2016 were not positive—they were 
exhausting, frustrating, draining.  The peace negotiations looked bleak.  Colombia was 
chaotic.    
 
March 23rd came.  With tears in my sleep-deprived eyes, I felt betrayed, powerless, 
frustrated, and hopeless.  The long-awaited signature that would concretize a peace 
agreement between the FARC and the government would not happen on the planned date, 
March 23rd 2016.  I knew it wouldn’t.  I knew it was for the best—A haphazard 
agreement between two actors still in disagreement about issues like disarmament, just to 
meet a deadline would be regrettable and shameful.  Yet, reading this on the cover of El 
Tiempo still hurt me deeply.  Why were these two parties so frustrating? I despised them 
for it.  I despised the government for its corruption, its abandonment of the people, its 
lack of infrastructure, its self-interest, and its ineptitude.  I despised the FARC for the 
fifty plus years of suffering, of killing, of human rights violations, for wearing white in 
Havana as if they really wanted peace and for continuing to have the audacity of claiming 
they were fighting for the people.  I despised both parties for not having met the deadline, 
for not having worked within these six months to meet a deadline that they had set 
themselves.  I despised them for not letting me write in my thesis that peace had been 
signed.  I want peace, I really want peace, I’m exhausted, we are exhausted.  No one had 
asked them for that date, yet they chose it, announced it to the world on September 23rd 
2015, and took a Kodak-moment picture as a congratulatory pat in the back.  Second 
dagger.  
 
	vii	
I continued working on my thesis, motivated by the support and advice of my thesis 
advisor—we were close to the end and it felt good.  Then the third dagger came. 
 
Imagine watching a marathon of horror movies in the middle of the night and knowing 
that everything you had seen was true.  That is how I felt as soon as I put down the 
narrative of displaced victims Throwing Stones at the Moon, to grab a London Fog at the 
Motley coffeehouse.  My hands were trembling, my heart was palpitating and my teeth 
were chattering.  I was gasping for air and crying.  A dry cry.  No tears, but rather a 
hyperventilating cry.  Dry sobs of frustration, anger, sadness, and disgust.  I wanted to be 
strong.  I thought I was.  Reading account after account of murders, suffering, of real 
families trapped in an endless cycle of violence, is enough to destabilize anyone.  I am 
attached to this.  By curse or by blessing I was born in the same land as these people 
whose suffering and testament are enough to weaken your knees and leave your mouth 
open, aghast in horror and respect.  This suffering continues.  It hurts to know.  I can’t do 
anything.  This fratricide continues and God knows until how long.    
 
I don’t know when this will stop.  I don’t know when people, who by chance were born 
to a poor family in the countryside, who by chance were deemed to be marginalized, who 
by chance became victims, who by chance became combatants, will have the same right 
to dignity, the same right to live and the same right to peace as any other human being, as 
the politicians who are disgustingly stuffing their pockets and sending the infrastructure 
of the country and the future of their constituents a la mierda. 
 
My homeland betrayed me.  It’s horrifying to feel pessimistic and let go of whatever little 
string of goodness I saw.  It’s horrifying to feel ashamed of where I was born.  It’s 
horrifying to only see a country through its politics and violence, knowing that the people 
are more than that.  It’s horrifying to become disillusioned.  But once it happens, it’s 
done.  The veil is gone.  I see the stark reality and it’s hopeless.  I’ve read and 
investigated enough to taint the idealistic image I had kept in my heart, enough for bitter 
disenchantment.  The veil of nostalgia is in tatters; I do not yearn for a glorious return nor 
cherish the memory of this country whose violence disgusts me.   
 
I was writing an academic piece and had to be systematic.  No more emotional 
attachment or else I would not be able to finish it.  I am exhausted but I want to do justice 
to the topic.  I want to do justice to the individuals who have been affected by the 
conflict, who in reality are all Colombians, all sectors of society, whether by violence or 
simply fear.  We (?) have all been affected by this conflict in one-way or another.  It is 
within our consciousness, our narrative and our blood, it hurts, it affects all Colombians, 
and deep within each there is nothing more than they would want than to one day within 
their lifetime see peace.  Incorporating the narratives into prose for chapter two was one 
of the most difficult aspects of my thesis.   
~~~ 
 
The journey is over.  This has been as much an academic journey as a personal journey.  
It has been humbling and exciting.  It did prove to be the academic climax that my 
International Professors had promised.  I am hopeful now, not as pessimistic and hopeless 
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as I have felt, because I know that in spite of everything, the irresistible joy and passion 
for living of the Colombian people will continue to keep the country alive. 
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Introduction
For more than fifty years, war has become so entrenched within the Colombian 
imaginary that a transition to peace seems almost utopic.  The internal armed conflict is 
not merely two-sided, but has embroiled guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, the military, and 
narcotraffickers.  This violence has been part of a history of lawlessness, corruption, and 
a weak central government.  Colombians have become accustomed to human rights 
violations and cynical about any government claims that new initiatives will end the war. 
Over the years, the numerous attempts at peace, including truces, ceasefires, and 
combatant amnesties, have lacked solutions that prioritize a sustainable process for 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.  Yet since 2003, the Colombian 
government has implemented and prioritized a three-pronged policy known as 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in an attempt to bundle the 
disparate elements that appear to be necessary components for long-term peace.  
Disarmament includes the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of arms; 
demobilization is the dismantling of armed groups and the discharge of combatants; and 
reintegration is a multistep process in which ex-combatants become integrated into 
civilian life.  According to the United Nations, the main purpose of DDR is to provide 
stability and security in a post-conflict society so that it can develop and make a 
transition to peace.   
The conflict’s magnitude, length, and continuity render the DDR process 
complicated: Colombia is not yet in a post-conflict state, but rather in a pre-post-conflict 
one.  Not only is it important to take into account the continued aggressions throughout 
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the history and evolution of DDR in Colombia, but also the complications that arise in 
attempting to dismantle and integrate various armed groups into a society that is not yet 
in a transition state.  Nevertheless, the DDR process in Colombia is worthy of attention 
because of the current peace negotiations that could potentially end the conflict between 
the Government of Colombia and Colombia’s largest armed insurgent group.  This latest 
attempt at negotiations has been materializing in Havana since 2012.  The end of the 
conflict comes at the price of impunity and compromises the definition of justice for 
many, polarizing a society that demands peace.  How will post-conflict processes like 
DDR guide Colombia to a future peace amidst of the complex politics of peacemaking?    
The first chapter will be a literature review that evaluates the turbulent history of 
peacemaking, focusing on the factors that have made peace elusive, examining the failed 
attempts at peace, and thus chronologically arriving at the Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration (DDR) processes.  The second chapter will provide an in-depth 
analysis of the “R” in the DDR processes through a theoretical framework of cooperation, 
the dimensions and logistics of reintegration and a compilation of narratives.  The 
following chapter will analyze the current peace negotiations and the winding road to a 
failed deadline through current events and political scandals.  In this way, the political 
and social atmosphere into which we need to implement DDR policies will be understood 
so that in the fourth and final chapter possible future scenarios can be considered and 
analyzed. 
This thesis aims to study Colombia’s post-conflict processes and peacemaking 
politics to understand how the gap between civil society and the recently demobilized 
will be closed, how social institutions and community projects will help heal the wounds 
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of an entire nation, and how collective hate can turn into collective action to move 
forward.  Peace is far from becoming part of the Colombian imaginary—the way in 
which Colombians see themselves, their country and their identity—but studying DDR 
processes in the midst of an elusive peace will add to the scholarship that will encourage 
the unity of a people. 
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Chapter One: A Troubled History of Peacemaking 
 
I. An Elusive Peace 
In order to understand the contemporary internal armed conflict in Colombia, we 
need to understand its history of violence, as well as the various factors that have 
rendered peace elusive thus far.  Since the start of independence in the nineteenth 
century, Colombia has been plagued by lawlessness, social injustice and a weak central 
government.  Eight civil wars shook the new nation in the nineteenth century (Kline 8).  
The twentieth century witnessed two more: a short period of partisan violence in 1932 
and La Violencia in 1946 (Kline 8).  Blood has become an indelible ink recording a 
history of incessant suffering.     
The end of La Violencia in 1956—named thus because of immeasurable carnage 
—gave way to the contemporary internal armed conflict of the past fifty years.  Why has 
a nation whose economy is one of the strongest in Latin America been in an incessant 
cycle of violence?  Will there finally be a peace process that takes into account all the 
failures of the past that have rendered peace elusive? What will be the new approach that 
will consolidate the need for peace, the demand for justice, and the assurance that 
violence will become an unthinkable method with which to pursue political goals? 
After the slaughter during La Violencia that embroiled the Conservative and 
Liberal parties in a civil war, conflict emerged along new lines: four guerrilla groups 
founded on Marxist ideologies, paramilitary groups, and drug dealers became part of a 
multi-front internal conflict.  The four guerrilla groups included the Nineteenth of April 
Movement (M-19), the Popular Army of Liberation (EPL), the Armed Forces of the 
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Colombian Revolution (FARC), and the Army of National Liberation (ELN).  Only the 
latter two remain active today.  The FARC is the largest and oldest group—in 2003 it had 
about 20,000 active combatants (Kline 10).  It is with the FARC that the current peace 
negotiations commenced in La Habana, Cuba since 2012.  On September 23, 2015 the 
Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, reached a momentous deal with the FARC, 
which entails signing a definite peace agreement within the next six months.  Only time 
will tell the fruition of this latest attempt at peace. 
 
Internal Factors: Government Structure or Lack Thereof 
Various scholars have tried to explain the factors that have played a role in the 
troubled history of peacemaking, focusing in great part on state capacity and political 
structures.  First of all, from the beginning, the state lacked a strong police or military 
force that could enforce its decisions.  The vacuum of government authority in providing 
state security—one of the most basic and primary state functions—has led to lawlessness 
and the formation of armed groups, such as “self-defense” groups know as paramilitaries.  
In addition to lawlessness, the nature of politics was founded on violence in such a way 
as to subvert any chance of changing the status quo through a democratic process without 
arms.  From La Violencia, the strict partisan segmentation led to an intense partisan 
socialization of the masses, meaning that people were compelled to identify with one 
party or another.  The traditional oligarchic and violent setup of the liberal and 
conservative parties led to a political competition that has not been limited to peaceful 
means.  Because of the structural exclusion of the marginalized masses, they sought 
political transformation through violence, so peasants have been accustomed to putting 
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up arms to access politics instead of engaging in democratic voting processes (Kline; 
Derk 11).  Even as the old party setups developed into the coalition of the National Front 
(1958-1974), the long-lasting state weakness was not altered.  Although the previous 
partisan sectarianism had dissolved, clientelism remained and dominated the subsequent 
political culture.   
Thus, the state has not been built in such a way as to be able to cope with conflicts 
because Colombian policymakers choose political survival through clientelism over long-
term state-building—a tradeoff called the “Politician’s Dilemma” (Geddes 18).  In other 
words, the priorities of political leaders have not aligned with the general interest of 
ensuring social justice, long-term state building, and long-term peace building, but rather 
with their own corrupt self-interest.   
A more specific theory of the Colombian government structure by Orozco 
purports that the axis of conflict is not vertical asymmetrical, but rather horizontal 
symmetrical (2005).  A horizontal conflict is a conflict between armed actors or political 
parties and a vertical conflict refers to the relations of power between the citizens and the 
state.  In his study, Orozco finds different implications of the horizontal and vertical 
relations of power, concluding that the dynamics from horizontal relations are much more 
complicated.  For one, vertical abuse of power is clearer than horizontal abuse of power.  
Horizontal symmetrical conflicts involve broader sectors of the population, have longer-
lasting armed confrontations, and are difficult to bring to a concrete end.  A horizontal 
symmetrical system thus complicates internal conflict dynamics and makes the conflict 
much more difficult to control. 
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Violence has been able to endure because of the weakness in the government 
structure, as well as the intrinsic violence in the political culture.  The government is thus 
incapable of ensuring state security and of building a state that can withstand conflict.  A 
weak state puts the nation at risk of enduring conflict.   The state cannot prevent politics 
from turning violent—for the most part, crime intermingles with politics and corrodes 
state power (Roskin 2001).  This intersection of violence and politics has been present at 
both the local and the state level, even permeating Congress at one point during the 
‘parapolitics’ scandal in 2006, which “has resulted in judicial proceedings against over 
one-third of the 260 representatives in Congress, 324 military officers and 109 public 
officials, among others, on charges of colluding with the paramilitary militia” (Derks et 
al. 12). 
Similarly, Waldmann summarizes the state’s weakness by noting that the 
Colombian state has remained a weak state unable to enforce its own laws and discipline 
its own people; its power is incapable of guaranteeing public security.  Yet the state 
certainly exists in public consciousness like a physical and intellectual physical entity 
(Waldmann 2007).   
The structural limitations from the regime and the national political system have 
been obstacles to solve the conflict—it is difficult for a government to provide a solution 
while a state policy is nonexistent (Restrepo 2006).  According to Restrepo, it is not the 
lack of willingness or government incapability that impedes the formulating of effective 
policy in the face of conflict, but rather it is the structure and operating rules of the 
Colombian democracy. 
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Culture of Violence 
Emerging from studies of the political economy of war and the economic 
motivations of the actors involved in conflict is a body of theory positing a culture of 
violence.  Linda Helfrich and Sabine Kurtenbach define this as model of behavior in 
which violence becomes part of the basis of life for a considerable part of the population 
(Helfrich/Kurtenbach 2006).  They assert that when a culture of violence is present, the 
possibility of ending the war is diminished.  In the case of Colombia, Daniel Pécaut states 
that violence and coercion have become so ingrained in its social and political system of 
order, that it cannot simply be removed—violence is another social sub-system that is 
continuously replicated (Pécaut 1987, 2001). 
Peter Waldmann, professor of sociology, defines a culture of violence as a 
“phenomenon that is itself dependent on historical and social factors…[and] includes all 
socio-cultural structures and symbols that are connected with, produced by, and 
perpetuate violence” (2007: 63).  In order to track this said culture of violence, he asserts, 
we must look for covert or indirect indications and pay attention to the conceptual and 
ideological settings in which acts of violence occur.  In Colombia, almost every aspect of 
life has been affected by violence and a wide general desensitization, even tolerance, of 
acts of violence is present.  He claims that the indicators of the presence of a culture of 
violence are: (1) Structural indicators that develop from the nature of violence in 
Colombia, including the frequency of violence, its intensity, and its diversity (2) 
Psychological indicators that suggest that there is a widespread propensity to violence 
and (3) A lack of taboos and prohibitive rules that would limit the use of violence 
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(Waldmann 2007: 65).  In order to support these claims, Waldmann uses historical, 
sociological, sociocultural and anthropological observations.  
For the first indicator, it is important to understand the ubiquity of violence in the 
country: the propensity to violence is ingrained in a sociocultural manner that goes across 
multiple social and historical frameworks.  Furthermore, not only has violence been 
constant and frequent, but it has also been professionalized by the multiple armed 
organizations and groups that function outside the law and use violence as a means to 
their ends.  This professionalization of violence is partly the result of the development of 
techniques from shared learning processes, experience, and mutual imitation.  The scale 
and brutality of violence also illustrate the intensity of violence in Colombia.  This 
intensity is only probable in a social context in which the limits to unauthorized use of 
violence have been basically removed and substituted by a “cult of annihilation of 
enemies” (Waldmann 2007: 66). 
For the second indicator, the mental indicators that suggest that there is a 
widespread propensity to violence, Waldmann argues that given that violence is deep in 
the collective consciousness and cultural memory, we can identify a friend-foe 
dichotomy.  This in-group/out-group framework makes a post-conflict reintegration even 
more challenging because it creates a “tit for tat” approach to violence.  Game theorists 
also use the term “tit for tat,” characterizing this culture of violence as an iterated game 
where there is universal defection (Axelrod).  Moreover, the “tit for tat” that is evident in 
the friend-foe model is overlaid by a discourse of honor and a need to retaliate violent 
acts, which results in a deleterious social labeling process that further polarizes the 
society.  Colombian society has also become desensitized to life or death—there is little 
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regard for human life and human death, as evidenced by the small sums for which 
sicarios kill off strangers and by the little respect for and the banalization of corpses 
(Waldmann 2007: 67).    
 For the third factor, Waldmann argues for the absence of prohibitive norms that 
inhibit violence.  Even in the media, the interest is more on the conflict narrative than on 
the violent acts themselves (unless they are particularly brutal).  Violence is part of the 
everyday routine and experience, leading to a lack of public discussion and discourse on 
violence.    
 
Narcotics trade: “The fuel that feeds the conflict”1  
 Drug trafficking has further aggravated the violence and conflict in Colombia.  
Through murders, tortures, and other human rights violations, as well as bombings in the 
major cities, the Medellin and Cali group “brought the nation to its knees” during the 
1980s (Kline 2007: 15).   According to Kline, narcotrafficking had a role in undermining 
the rule of law, increasing violence, and more specifically in aggravating paramilitary 
violence.  Yet the paramilitaries were not the only ones who developed relationships with 
the drug traffickers and became involved in this for-profit violence: Guerrilla groups 
became involved by first protecting their coca fields, then “taxing” them, and also by 
directly entering the industry.  Their heavy involvement in the production and trade of 
narcotics has been one of the factors in “the longevity and resilience of the guerrilla 
movement,” especially because this indicates the shift in their motivation to fight the state 
from merely political to territorial and economic (Derks et al. 16).  Narcotics compelled a 																																																								1	Humberto de la Calle, Colombia’s chief peace negotiator in Havana, called the illegal 
drug trade “the fuel that feeds the conflict” in November 2013 (Otis 2014). 
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profit-driven war.    The money from narcotrafficking bought weapons, equipment and 
food for thousands of full-time combatants.  The involvement of narcotics in conflict 
underscores an important but often overlooked feature of mass violence: war is 
expensive.  And narcotrafficking was the solution.   
Narcotrafficking also became entangled in the political sphere, both in the 
national congress and in the presidency (Kline 2007: 17).  Various scholars agree that the 
drug production and trade has led to a situation where violence has crossed into the 
political realm and opened the door for violence to become more pervasive in all areas of 
society as an instrument for enforcement and power (Pécaut 2001).  Waldmann concludes 
that narcotrafficking has allowed for violence to become more conventional and banal—
further normalizing the violence of the conflict.   
 The drug trade did not end at the dismantling of the Medellín and Cali cartels.  
New smaller groups have continued to quench the increasing global demand for 
narcotics.  In fact, Geoff Simons argues that the international community is partly to 
blame for Colombia’s problems because the highest demand for cocaine comes from the 
US and Europe.  Likewise, both the chemicals used in the process of turning coca into 
cocaine and the laundered money come from the U.S. and Europe (Simons 2004: 250).  
The drug problem is the responsibility of both the supply and the demand sides.    
External Factors 
Other literature points to external factors perpetuating the conflict.  Scholars such 
as Helfrich and Kurtenbach have argued that if powerful states in international 
community do not have an interest in the resolution of the conflict at hand, violence could 
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rage for years (2006).  Consequently, it is important for these external members to be 
invested and interested in a strategic and long lasting peace.  If powerful members of the 
international community intervene to advance their own commercial and geopolitical 
interests, then their involvement in turn could be seen as perpetuating or even worsening 
the conflict.   
The role of external forces in Colombia’s armed conflict is emphasized in Geoff 
Simons’ book, Colombia: A Brutal History.  He argues that American control, 
involvement, and presence, politically and economically, have complicated the internal 
conflict by making Colombia dependent and thus further increasing wealth inequality and 
social injustice.  He concludes that after La Violencia, the internal armed struggle 
continued partly because of the involvement of the United States.  As in other nations, the 
U.S. fueled civil turmoil to advance its larger Cold-War agenda.  Specifically, he points 
to U.S. involvement in the creation of Plan Lazo, which was a counterinsurgency strategy 
that involved American training for Colombian civilian and military personnel to perform 
counter-propaganda and counter-agency functions to take action against known 
communist proponents (Simons 48).  He also points to the Alliance for Progress, which 
was a program pushed by the Kennedy administration to “provide money, expertise, and 
technology to raise the standard of living for the people of Latin America, which would 
hopefully make the countries stronger and better able to resist communist influences” 
(History 2007).  Gradually, Colombian agriculture, economic assets and armed forces 
were brought under US control.  Over the decades U.S. pressure rose even more, as 
involvement increased during the drug wars.  In fact, it can be contended that during the 
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Clinton administration, the U.S. was using the drug issue as a cover-up for military 
involvement, pouring arms and military tactics into the hands of paramilitaries.   
The U.S. was even leading a campaign of spraying the Colombian jungles and 
plantations aerially with herbicides such as glyphosate, which was not only destroying 
coca cultivation, but also poisoning other crops, destroying local economies and 
propagating resentment among the local populations.  During the Bush administration, 
the military aspects of Plan Colombia were pursued more intensely and preferred over 
any kind of peace dialogue—the U.S. government kept injecting arms and troops and 
eschewing peace dialogues despite the consequent prolonged suffering, displacement, 
massacres, poisoning of the land, and even more disillusioned people.  American 
involvement with the “thumbs-up” from the Colombian government was yet another U.S. 
instigated dirty war in Latin America (Simons 2004). 
In her article “Colombia-Estados Unidos: Alcances Y Limitaciones,” Arlene B. 
Tickner does not ascribe instrumental blame for violence to U.S. involvement so 
vehemently as Simons, but rather focuses on problems with its scope and limitations.  
She presents U.S. involvement in a more objective and historical manner and emphasizes 
the commitment that the U.S. has had in regards to the long-lasting armed conflict.  
Nevertheless, she recognizes the negative effects from the way in which the U.S. wrote 
and implemented Plan Colombia.  She even refers to the relationship with the U.S. as an 
“aggressive subversion” that has led to an increased American interference in Colombian 
internal affairs, and has negatively affected Colombia’s relationship with other states in 
the region (Tickner 2006).  Furthermore, she acknowledges other results, like the gradual 
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strengthening of the military forces and the assurance of limited funds to jumpstart 
processes of institutional strengthening and development.   
 
Failed Attempts at Peacemaking 
Without including the current peace dialogues, in the history of the conflict, there 
have been five rounds of negotiations: (1) Under the presidency of Belisario Betancur 
(1982-1986) with FARC, M-19, ADO (Autodefensa Obrera), and EPL (Ejército Popular 
de Liberación) (2) Under the presidency of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) first with the 
Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolivar, and then with the M-19 (3) Under the 
presidency of Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) with EPL, Quintín Lame, PRT (Partido 
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores), the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar 
(FARC, ELN), and CRS (Corriente de Renovación Socialista), a division of the ELN (4) 
Under the presidency of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) with FARC and ELN (5) under the 
presidency of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) with the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia) (Helfrich/Kurtenbach 2006). 
To understand the failures of the processes, Kline uses a framework based on 
themes present in the negotiations.  These themes include the lack of unity, the lack of 
government continuity, the symbolic imperial presidency, the Politician’s Dilemma, and 
“the devil is in the details” (2007, 22).  In terms of lack of unity, he argues that there has 
been division between the government and the civilians, and between the president and 
the military.  He similarly argues that both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries lacked a 
unified voice, as did levels of the state at national and regional levels.  For the lack of 
government continuity, he notes that elections are every four years and so there is a 
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change in the negotiating team that undermines the negotiating power of the government.  
For symbolism and the imperial presidency, he notes how any opposition to what the 
president says is seen as disloyalty.  Likewise, Colombian presidents are more 
preoccupied in making their place in history, leading to unwise decisions, dangerous 
posturing and an over-centralization of negotiations.  An inability to accept responsibility 
and blame others is also a subtheme within the government and armed groups.  For the 
Politician’s Dilemma, he discusses how politicians have prioritized political gains over 
nation building or long-term peace processes.  The last theme “the devil is in the details” 
mentions that accords and negotiations have lacked necessary details leading to a 
difficulty of interpretation (Kline 2007).  
 Although each peace process or negotiation has had different factors that have 
made it unsuccessful, this thematic framework combines commonalities present in the 
Colombian government and society.  Consolidating these themes allows a uniform and 
observational approach to understanding why the attempts at negotiation have been futile.  
Furthermore, when formulating the negotiations, the parties that have been in the 
conflict rarely take into account long-term work on the origins of the conflict, or the 
construction of appropriate social contexts, norms and institutions that count with the 
previous structural conditions to be peaceful.  Instead, for many governments “peace” is 
simply disarmament and the cessation of fighting, prioritizing short-term measures over 
long-term measures.  Likewise, for some actors continuing with the system of violence is 
more simple and profitable (Helfrich/Kurtenbach 2006, 17).  In other words, these 
attempts at peace have lacked solutions that prioritize a sustainable process for 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.   
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II. Arrival at DDR 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
Taking into consideration the failures of the past peace processes, we arrive at a 
three pronged-approach ubiquitous in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding—
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).   Disarmament includes the 
collection, documentation, control, and disposal of arms; demobilization is the 
dismantling of armed groups and the discharge of combatants; and reintegration is a 
multistep process in which ex-combatants become integrated into civilian life.   The 
international community has developed DDR programs as a response to the perceived 
risk to revert to violence if ex-combatants are not successfully rehabilitated and 
reintegrated into the community (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2010).  According to 
the United Nations, the main purpose of DDR is to provide stability and security in a 
post-conflict society so that it can develop and make a transition to peace (Theidon 
2007).   
In global terms, DDR has been implemented in over 25 countries in a span of over 
25 years (Global DDR Summit 2013).  These cases include operations that have been 
implemented into UN peacekeeping missions that extend back to 1989, while programs 
without international assistance even date back to 1953 (Malan 5; Schulhofer-Wohl and 
Sambanis 1).  The 2010 report “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
Programs: An Assessment,” divides the DDR programs in two categories: those that have 
included external assistance and those that have not.  According to this assessment, DDR 
programs have been implemented “in a total of 51 civil wars that were active during the 
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period 1979 to 2006” (1)2.  For civil wars that have ended since 1994, DDR programs 
have been related to 38 post-civil war contexts, demonstrating the upsurge in new DDR 
programs from the middle of the 1990s on (Sculhofer-Wohl and Sambanis).   
The School for a Culture of Peace, which works on issues like human rights and 
the analysis of conflicts and peace processes, published comparative analyses of the DDR 
process and its evolution on a yearly basis between 2006 and 2009.  Although each report 
is different in format, each analyzes the components of DDR, as well as the specificities 
of each program according to the contexts of each country.  Comparative reports such as 
these afford a better understanding of Colombia’s place in the global context of DDR.   
Colombia has a long history of demobilization and dismantlement of armed 
groups followed by the reincorporation and reintegration of their members.  In fact, by 
looking at Sculhofer-Wohl and Sambanis’s data, it can be inferred that processes that 
include components of DDR go back to 1953 for La Violencia. Colombia is one few 
nations that has conducted DDR processes without external assistance—from the six 
selected cases without external assistance it is actually the one with the earliest DDR 
process (48).   Through structural and political changes, the DDR-like processes have 
evolved throughout the years to become the labeled DDR process for which Colombia is 
known today.   
According to Derks et al., four DDR processes have taken place since the 1980s.  
He divides the DDR processes into four specific moments: (1) A general amnesty for 																																																								
2It is important to note that in Table A.2: Civil Wars and DDR Programs Conducted 
without External Assistance, Selected Cases, they list two processes whose DDR years go 
back further: China (1954–1958) with the PLA conflict and Colombia (1953-1953) with 
La Violencia. 
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guerrillas in 1982 (2) A DDR process for guerrilla groups including the M19 and the 
Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), which reached a peace agreement with the 
government in the first half of the 1990s (3) A third DDR process that has been running 
since 1994, with a focus “on individual deserters from the guerilla movement, and to a 
more limited extent from other illegal armed groups that have not signed up to the 
‘collective’ DDR initiative” (4) A larger process of DDR through the demobilization of 
the paramilitary forces from 2002 to 2006 (Derks et al 2011, 17-20). 
 
DDR in Colombia had been implemented within a military/security framework, 
so although a DDR process was present after the 1990’s negotiations, national 
reconciliation and a system for long-term sustainable transition to peace was not achieved 
(Theidon 2007; Jaramillo 2009).  The weaknesses of the DDR framework were evident in 
the previous efforts of demobilization.  For example, under the Betancur administration 
(1982-1986) the legal environment reflected blanket amnesties in exchange for ‘peace 
and stability’ and the government did not consider what would happen to ex-combatants 
after demobilization (Theidon 2007).  Thus, the demobilized guerrilla members enjoyed 
complete amnesty and were deprived of institutional support as they reintegrated 
themselves into society.   
Since 2003, the Colombian government has been implementing a reintegration 
policy that has been based on experience from post-conflict processes in other countries.  
It has focused more on long-term solutions that emphasize the post-conflict societal 
integration (DDR Summit 2013).  This focus on reintegration has been part of the most 
current DDR rhetoric and implementation.  In fact, the dynamics, goals, and framework 
of the DDR process have greatly evolved and developed since 2003, since the groups 
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with whom the demobilization process occurred, as well as the presidential 
administration, have changed.  More literature and analysis have also emerged that have 
been able to better analyze the pitfalls and relative successes in this 10-year DDR 
process.  This current DDR process has received financing from other countries including 
the United States, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, and Japan, and it has been monitored 
by the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Peace Process in 
Colombia (MAPP-OEA) and supported by the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) (Prieto 29).   
During the Uribe administration, a collective demobilization began with members 
from the paramilitary group AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia); the dialogue 
began in 2003 and materialized in the signing of the Santa Fe de Ralito Pact by the 
federal government and the AUC.  This occurred under Uribe’s ‘Democratic Security 
Policy,’ in which he promoted the consolidation of state control over all of Colombia’s 
territory.  Following this policy and the demobilization of the paramilitaries, the violence 
against civilians decreased—Colombia was no longer the most violent country in Latin 
America (Derks et al. 11).   
After this effort at collective demobilization, there has been individual 
demobilization and reintegration of combatants without a formal peace agreement 
between their former group and the Colombian government (Jaramillo 2009).   He argues 
that this has posed great challenges in the transitional DDR process because it is difficult 
for an assurance of truth, reparation, and justice to exist when there are multiple 
negotiated agreements with individuals.  Without a uniformity of policy measures that 
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dictate the path for DDR processes for all ex-combatants, it is more difficult to establish 
and control the guidelines of transitional justice.   
In 2006, the process of reintegration reached an important point: “Reforms carried 
out in 2006, leading to the creation of the High Council for Reintegration (Alta 
Consejería para la Reintegración – ACR), rekindled expectations in DDR and reoriented 
the process towards a business-friendly strategy of securing employment for ex-
combatants” (Derks et. al 8).  While this new approach seemed to address the concerns 
for a more sustainable reintegration of former combatants, it failed to address the 
economic reality in the country, rebuild social capital in communities that had been 
scarred by decades of conflict, and increase business interest to the demobilized.  Instead, 
it created a dependent population of demobilized combatants that is “locked into 
attending reintegration courses, shuns society, and is increasingly exposed to the 
temptations and violent intimidation of new criminal groups” (Derks et. al 4). 
In his literature, Jaramillo focuses on the demobilization effort during the Uribe 
presidency, analyzing the DDR process in 2009.  He brings some clarity on the earlier 
DDR efforts and their gaps and contends that the DDR needed to be more specific and 
specialized for different populations, such as women and children.  Likewise, DDR was 
not specialized for specific regional and municipal needs, failing to consider the local 
dynamics in which the DDR processes would be implemented.  In order for a DDR 
process to be successful, Jaramillo further concludes that it is necessary to have the 
cooperation and involvement of local authorities, have a long-term income-earning 
strategy for the demobilized, have psychological and legal assistance, and have an 
education strategy that allows the recently demobilized to be competitive in the 
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workforce—all of these factors were missing from the DDR process as of 2009.  
Reintegration is key in this post-conflict process and strong legislation that responds to 
the needs of the demobilized and the victims is key.  Moreover, according to him, a 
successful long-term reintegration program is based on reintegration and not on 
reinsertion and should accomplish three main goals: “(1) effectively return demobilized 
persons to civilian life; (2) break the cycles of violence; and (3) reconcile members of 
society” (Jaramillo 2009, 21). 
Other literature points to the importance of focusing on the “R” of DDR.  
Reintegration is a long-term and complex process that must include community 
involvement and follow-up programs—consequently it is usually the weakest link in the 
DDR process (Faltas 2004).   The “R” is not only the most important part of the process, 
but it is also one of the more expensive and difficult parts.  If suitable planning for 
reintegration process is absent, it is likely that the disarmament and demobilization will 
not be successful (DDR Summit 2013).   
To address the reintegration component, Kimberly Theidon focuses her research 
on the reintegration of demobilized combatants.  She argues that the DDR has to be 
implemented at multiple levels, including ensuring a comprehensive reintegration for ex-
combatants.  It is imperative for DDR programs to include concrete, local-level 
transitional justice initiatives that address the needs of both the ex-combatants and the 
receiving society.   
In the report by the Peace Security and Development Network, entitled “A 
Community Dilemma: DDR and the changing face of violence in Colombia,” Derks, 
Rouw and Briscoe conclude that in order for reintegration to be successful, community 
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involvement needs to be at the center.  They argue for the need for greater local 
involvement and freedom to cater DDR to local needs and dynamics to better serve the 
ex-combatants and the receiving community.   
Is it Worthwhile to continue? 
In order to address the gaps in the DDR process and have a strong framework that 
guarantees a successful transition to peace, Colombia has had two international 
collaboration events: the first one in Cartagena in June 2009, the Cartagena International 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR), and the second one 
in Santa Marta in December 2013, the First Global Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (GDDR) Summit.  During both conferences a consensus was reached 
around the importance of international collaboration with states that have faced or are 
facing security development (DDR Summit 2013).  The overarching goal was to create a 
space for discussion and exchange of knowledge that would contribute to reintegration 
programs worldwide, while promoting South-South cooperation.  According to the 
official report of the summit, these two summits contributed to the discussion and 
understanding of DDR processes and experiences internationally.  The report makes it 
seem like Colombia is at the vanguard of the DDR process globally.  What the report 
lacks is a more critical view of the current DDR process, as well as concrete evidence on 
how exactly the state will have the capacity to implement all the needed measures and 
norms discussed in detail.  Nevertheless, the collaboration and the findings included in 
this report provide great detail on the challenges and strategies for knowledge sharing, as 
well as an overall comprehensive break-down of what a successful DDR process entails.  
Likewise, it provides a view of the goals, as well as the policy stance, of the Colombian 
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government in regards to the implementation of DDR.  The years of failed attempts have 
led to the need to prioritize this key three-pronged post-conflict process.   
Additionally, this report highlights six lessons learned from the ten years of 
implementation and development of DDR in Colombia: (1) Time is integral and 
initiatives should have a defined time frame within the context of state capacity (2) All 
sectors of society, including all levels of government, the international community, 
academia, and the private sector need to have a shared responsibility established (3) 
Policy leaders have to prioritize reconciliation that accounts for the reintegration of 
demobilized combatants into their native communities (4) Guaranteeing the security 
demobilized combatants is necessary (5) Legal mechanisms that ensure the legal security  
and judicial stability for demobilized combatants must be implemented (6)  Finally, 
permanent and strong institutional systems that ensure the long-term implementation of 
reintegration policies must be created (Global Summit 2013, 8).  Taking into account the 
efforts of the Colombian government at initiating global conversations on DDR and 
formulating a detailed plan of action, could it be contended that this time the DDR 
process will be successful and will play an integral role in breaking the cycle of violence?  
Another consideration for the success of the DDR process is the continuation of 
the conflict.  It is challenging to implement mechanisms of transitional justice, reparation 
and reconciliation when the conflict is ongoing and armed groups continue with the 
violence.  Rather than being in a post-conflict state, Colombia remains in a ‘pre-
postconflict’ context, which creates an unfavorable security context for successful 
reintegration (Theidon 2007).  Within this ‘pre-postconflict’ state, ex-combatants cannot 
fully escape from the stigma of war.  Some government entities, like the DAS (Security 
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Administration Department) have used DDR as a counter-insurgency tool rather than as a 
tool for sustainable peace, offering incentives for ex-combatants to give information on 
the positions of their previous armed groups (Derks et al. 46).  Ex-combatants 
consequently become targets for threats and intimidation from armed groups, as they as 
seen as informants.  Without a doubt, the priority of creating sustainable peace is 
superseded by counter-insurgency efforts.  The ‘pre-postconflict’ context also means that 
a total ceasefire is not yet in place, which means continued killings, attacks, and 
displacement.    
Not having a defined end of the conflict complicates the transition from a violent 
state into a state without violence—how can ex-combatants and victims find respite and a 
new life when the conflict continues?  However, some transitions into post-conflict are 
not indicated by clear accords, but instead by a low-level protracted conflict and 
ambiguity (DDR Summit 2013).  As a result, it could be said that studying DDR is even 
more important and of greater interest because of the unique and critical condition of the 
Colombian situation.  Studying and understanding DDR will be greatly important to the 
current peace negotiations under the Santos presidency—perhaps DDR will make these 
peace accords different and they will eventually break the cycle of violence.  Only time 
will tell.    
 In summary, the different factors that explain the troubled history of making 
peace point to the need for a different approach that considers past failures and considers 
long-term consequences.  Given the range of options for a post-conflict (or rather pre-
post-conflict) transition into peace, the evidence suggests that a DDR process is 
necessary.  
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Second Chapter:  Reintegration 
 
I. The “R” in DDR 
 
 “Societies are made up by human beings whose minds are not tabula rasa.  It is 
in this sense that the impact of any program oriented towards social change must 
take…[it into account], as an alternative to keeping a fall back into an eternal 
yesterday, characterized by the persistence of mental models that favor violence, 
authoritarian forms of relationship and illegality” (Casas and Guzman, 80) 
Within the post conflict agenda, reintegrating ex-combatants back into society is 
one of the most difficult and crucial steps of the DDR process: difficult because it is a 
learning process that requires the cooperation of multiple segments of society, as well as 
implementing a complex and costly multi-step plan that needs to take into account the 
individualities of each ex-combatant and his receiving community; crucial because it 
determines whether the society will effectively break with a previous reality to have a 
chance at a peaceful post-conflict reality.  The reintegration process has also been one of 
the weakest parts of the DDR process because of the multiple challenges and gaps 
present.  
According to the ACR, reintegration is defined as “the return of demobilized 
people and people detached from the armed conflict to society and legality” (ACR 
Infographic).  Reintegration simultaneously affects institutional, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal dimensions of the human experience.  The institutional dimension is about 
DDR being a mechanism of transition between institutional universes; the interpersonal 
dimension refers to surpassing the social dilemma of reintegration, as well as to the 
institutional legitimacy needed for political reintegration; and the intrapersonal dimension 
refers to the emotional investment, the incentives for reintegration, and the values that 
Pico 26 
influence “attitudinal responses towards political and social order” (Casas and Guzman, 
2010, 55).   
The responsibility for the national reintegration policy has been under the 
Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) since November 2011 (ACR 2016).  Before this 
agency was created, the Program for the Reincorporation into Civilian Life (PRVC) 
under the Ministry of the Interior, with the support of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Peace, was in charge of designing and coordinating the Program for 
Reincorporation.  The PRVC however, lacked the long-term vision needed for a 
successful reintegration program.  In 2006, the High Office for Reintegration is created, 
becoming a milestone in the history of DDR since it marked the transition from a short-
term reincorporation program to a long-term reintegration program (ACR 2016).   
The change in terminology was important for reaffirming the long-term 
implications of this process.  Albeit reincorporation and reintegration appear to be 
synonyms, their etymologies reveal the importance of the choice of terms.  Reincorporate 
means to join something again with something that already exists, to put something into 
the body of something else, whereas reintegrate means to make whole again, to unite, to 
bring together different parts to make a whole. When the focus is placed on reintegrating 
ex-combatants, rather than incorporating them, a long-term and sustainable process is 
suggested: Reintegration implies that every segment of society will come together to 
make a whole, a new post-conflict society where all citizens are integrated into civil life 
in equality.  Reincorporation would consequently mean that ex-combatants are just being 
inserted into a different body or context, removing the responsibility of ensuring that ex-
combatants become part of the society—a long-term process.  
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The reintegration process must consider long-term implications and consequences 
that guarantee its sustainability and effectiveness.  It is the first phase in long-term 
process of social and economic integration (CONPES 61).  Its long-term goals are (1) To 
encourage demobilizations and a peaceful exit from the armed violence (2) to consolidate 
the advances in terms of security and to contribute to the construction of peace because of 
the disarmament and the demobilization of ex-combatants (3) to prevent that the 
demobilized returns to a life of arms and (4) to guarantee that violent acts will not be 
repeated and that there will be a reduction in victims from armed violence in the country, 
which is a fundamental component of reparation and the peaceful coexistence of 
Colombians (CONPES 26).  In order for these goals to be met, both the ex-combatants 
and the receiving communities need to cooperate in the process.      
 
Understanding Reintegration through the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The mutual cooperation between the ex-combatants and the receiving 
communities is more difficult to occur if both sides feel that they are forced to make 
concessions in the midst of violence or continued armed struggle.  It will seem futile to 
cooperate when the government has not succeeded in engaging in formal agreements with 
all the armed groups.  In fact, currently, there are no formal agreements for the cessation 
of violence with other armed groups besides the one that will supposedly materialize in 
Havana with the FARC and the one that will be starting with the ELN, as of May 30th, 
2016.   
Even though the pre-post-conflict aspect would make it difficult for both the 
receiving community and the ex-combatants to cooperate, this cooperation is integral to 
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prevent reintegration from becoming a social dilemma “in which the demobilized and the 
society coexist in violent and non-democratic contexts” (Casas and Guzman 74).   
 Casas and Guzman use Axelrod’s Prisoner’s Dilemma (1984) to model the 
dilemma of mutual cooperation in reintegration.   
A non-sequential simultaneous game is considered, because reintegration is 
explored under a local perspective, that is, from the interdependency relationship 
resulting from the moment the demobilized actor enters the community in a given 
neighborhood and starts interacting with his neighbors. In this type of game, 
actors’ responses are characterized by a non-futuristic vision and the 
maximization of personal benefits (71) 
In this model, the “basic problem occurs when the pursuit of self-interest by each leads to 
a poor outcome for all” (Axelrod 7). They also conclude that this interdependency 
relationship between the demobilized and the receiving society is dependent on mutual 
cooperation and consent and thus becomes a collective dilemma.  In the model, the two 
actors are society and the demobilized and their two options are cooperation and non-
cooperation (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1: The Reintegration Dilemma, modeled from Casas and Guzman 
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The top left quadrant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma square represents the optimal 
result, when both society and the demobilized cooperate.  According to the explanation, 
this mutual cooperation is when “society and the demobilized citizens cooperate to 
advance towards reintegration…[to favor] the construction of democratic and non-violent 
contexts and [strengthen] the legitimacy of Colombian institutions” (Casas and Guzman 
73).  In this (3,3) scenario, society would be receptive to the reintegration of the ex-
combatants, becoming part of a dialogue of peace and reconciliation and assuming the 
societal costs.  These costs would not necessarily be only monetary, although use of 
public resources on the process would be measurable and would result in some tradeoffs 
against other possible social goods.  The costs entail accepting a margin of impunity and 
risk of at least some limited residual violence from demobilized citizens or psychological 
trauma from ex-combatants’ presence in society.  Cooperation from the ex-combatants 
would mean that they would follow the steps of the reintegration process, abandoning 
violence, legitimizing social institutions and making an effort to construct a society 
where violence is not accepted. The top right quadrant represents a situation where the 
demobilized choose cooperation and society chooses non-cooperation (Casas and 
Guzman 73).  In this (1,4) scenario, although ex-combatants would cooperate and agree 
to reintegration, society would not be willing to undertake the costs of receiving members 
who once belonged to an armed group and follow a reconciliatory path.  Presumably, ex-
combatants would be displaced or assassinated by hostile neighbors.  This in turn would 
hinder the ex-combatant’s willingness to cooperate with the reintegration process.  The 
bottom left quadrant represents a situation where the demobilized citizens choose non-
cooperation and society chooses cooperation (Casas and Guzman 73).  In this (4,1) 
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scenario, society would be receptive to the reintegration process, while the demobilized 
citizens would not be willing to commit to the reintegration phase and they would revert 
back to violence, recidivism.  This would be counterproductive to the post-conflict 
process, as it would weaken the possibilities of societal cooperation since the efforts they 
made would be in vain and ex-combatants would continue to be stigmatized as the out-
group and the victimizers of society.  The bottom right quadrant represents a situation 
where both actors choose non-cooperation (Casas and Guzman 73).  In this Nash 
equilibrium (2,2) scenario, neither the society nor the demobilized combatant is willing to 
undergo the costs and sacrifices of reintegration, which would be detrimental to 
peacebuilding.  
When using this model to illustrate reintegration, it is necessary to understand that 
society is not monolithic.  In this instance, although the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a 
collective dilemma between society and the ex-combatants, it can be understood as a 
collection of multiple Prisoner’s Dilemmas repeating themselves in multiple instances.  
The set of motivations and incentives differ by community and individuals because their 
perceptions of ex-combatants vary depending on the way in which the group to which the 
ex-combatant belonged has affected them, whether directly or indirectly.  Each individual 
in society will have her own Prisoner’s Dilemma, which will allow her to judge her 
interaction with the ex-combatant on an individual basis, rather than by using the fifty-
year history of conflict to determine whether to cooperate or defect.  Individual 
interactions “allows one to handle interactions with many individuals without having to 
treat them all the same, thus making possible the rewarding of cooperation from one 
individual and the punishing or defection from another” (Axelrod 95). 
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Theoretically, how is it possible to ensure that individuals, from both the 
receiving community and the ex-combatant side, choose cooperation in their individual 
games?  What could incentivize individuals to cooperate with a perceived adversary?  In 
the short run, it is better to defect whether the enemy is doing damage or not, because for 
both sides weakening each other will promote survival, meaning that their specific 
interests will be prioritized (Axelrod 75).  Likewise, the fifty-year history of victim and 
victimizer has established what Axelrod calls “a powerful ethic of revenge…a question of 
doing what seemed moral and proper to fulfill one’s obligation to a fallen comrade” (85).  
Translated to reintegration, what Axelrod calls an “ethic of revenge” could be translated 
to not wanting to receive ex-combatants into a community because of their previous 
connection to an armed group and because it would be unjust to a victim, friend, or 
family member affected by an armed group, a “fallen comrade,” to receive these 
perpetrators of violence as if nothing had happened.  Yet the receiving communities and 
ex-combatants will have repeated interactions, multiple iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas, 
which makes defection an unstable strategy, and on a more optimistic note, according to 
Axelrod: 
When the conditions are present for the emergence of cooperation, cooperation 
can get started and prove stable in situations which otherwise appear 
extraordinarily unpromising…friendship is hardly necessary for the development 
of cooperation.  Under suitable conditions, cooperation based upon reciprocity 
can develop even between antagonists  (22). 
Cooperative exchanges of mutual restraint based on TIT FOR TAT retaliation could 
change the preset nature of interactions between two enemies because experiencing 
sustained mutual cooperation can change their payoffs and compel them to “care about 
each other’s welfare” and value mutual cooperation more than before (Axelrod 85).  For 
cooperative exchanges of mutual restraint to occur, an incentive is necessary to propel 
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positive behavior change. What then could incentivize the start of these cooperative 
exchanges?   
In the case of soldiers in World War I trenches, the soldiers made an effort to 
show to their enemy soldiers that they could retaliate mutual restraint, if necessary, 
because their lives depended on it (Axelrod 79).  These soldiers were in an active state of 
war, but members of receiving communities and ex-combatants are in a civilian state, 
where mutual cooperation generally does not equal life or death—at least in the short run.  
Intrinsic motivations for behavior in communities need to be part of what propels a 
cooperative interaction.  According to the economic paper, “When and Why Incentives 
(Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior,” shifting “from no incentive to a positive incentive 
can dramatically change the framing of the interaction” (Gneezy et al. 2011: 200).  By 
having a positive incentive, both ex-combatants and members of receiving communities 
will see their interaction as contributing to the construction of a common goal—peace.  In 
this framework of incentives, peace could be understood as the public good.  Therefore, 
the interactions of society and the demobilized could be pro-social behavior that 
contributes to this public good.  Yet why would individuals feel compelled to have a pro-
social preference to contribute to this public good?  Even having a pro-social preference 
is not sufficient for obtaining a level of contribution that could be deemed socially 
optimal (Meier, 2007).  Socially optimal would undoubtedly be mutual cooperation in the 
reintegration process.  Karl Dieter Opp presents a cost proposition, stating that “the 
higher the costs of contributing to the provision for the public good, the less likely is 
contribution” (Opp 50, 2009).  But what if the public good is greater than the high costs 
of cooperation?  In the case of Colombia, it would seem that the high costs of accepting a 
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margin of impunity and social integration, for civilians and ex-combatants respectively, 
would be less than the prospect of an eventual positive peace.   
Furthermore, if cooperative exchanges do arise, it would be necessary for 
cooperation to remain stable—that is for both parties to consistently cooperate in the 
process, not for the actors to discriminately choose how and when they are going to 
cooperate.  In other words, the decision to cooperate or not to cooperate must remain 
stable and constant.  A discriminatory cooperation would augment the already present 
mutual mistrust and skepticism.  Stable cooperation will in turn allow a greater trust to be 
formed, for each actor will be able to form a positive expectation of the other’s move, in 
what would become an iterated prisoner’s dilemma where TIT FOR TAT will equate to a 
social process of giving and receiving for the greater benefit of the community.  Axelrod 
notes that a process of familiarization allows cooperation to remain stable (80).  Thus, a 
type of socialization conducive to familiarization is necessary for each group to trust each 
other to cooperate and retaliate accordingly.  Familiarizing one group with the other will 
normalize the social interactions and contribute to the building of a tejido social.   
The potential success of the reintegration process is dependent on the success of 
the latest peace attempt at Havana with the FARC.  A cooperation-cooperation scenario 
in the peace negotiation, where the two actors are the Government and the FARC (Fig. 2) 
would be conducive to a cooperation-cooperation scenario in the reintegration prisoner’s 
dilemma since it would signal a concrete end to the engagement of violence for FARC 
ex-combatants.  The following section will briefly apply Axelrod’s model to the peace 
negotiations, to illustrate the connectivity of a bottom-level Prisoners Dilemma (the 
reintegration process) to a top-level Prisoner’s Dilemma (the peace negotiations), and the 
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impact of the latter on the former.  
Figure 2: The Peace Negotiation Dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The top left quadrant would be the optimal result, where both the Government and 
the FARC would cooperate.  In this (3,3) scenario both parties would continue the 
negotiations without delays or ulterior motives and would abide by the agreed 
concessions for the sole purpose of peace building.  The government would act to the best 
of its ability to withhold from corruption and politicking, as well as act in virtue of the 
general interest and of a long-term improvement in the social and economic development 
of the nation.  The FARC would in turn withhold from any form of violence or violence 
inducing acts during and after the negotiations, demonstrating a commitment to peace 
and to legitimizing democracy and the government institutions.  The top right quadrant 
The	Peace	Negotiation	Dilemma
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would mean that the FARC chooses cooperation and the government chooses non-
cooperation.  In this (1,4) situation, the government would not uphold its side of the 
concessions and act in a way that would diminish the possibilities of the successful 
implementation of a peace agreement.  This would include engaging in corrupt actions 
that sabotage the process and stimulate societal polarization, being unwilling to uphold 
the concessions delineated in the agreement, and neglecting to support the demobilized 
population after an agreement is signed.  If the government opts for non-cooperation, the 
FARC would reinforce its suspicion and rejection of the government institution, 
hindering a possible end to the conflict, as the armed group would find motives to 
reengage in their acts aggression.  The bottom left quadrant represents a situation where 
the FARC chooses non-cooperation and the government chooses cooperation.  This (4,1) 
scenario would illustrate yet another failed attempt by the government to negotiate with 
an armed group, and it would be an insult and ridicule on this different, more diplomatic 
approach to ending the conflict—similarly to what occurred during the Pastrana 
administration’s attempted peace talks with the FARC in 1999 through 2002.  Pastrana’s 
disastrous decision to pull the military out of a large portion of area where the FARC 
operated led to historically high records of victimization.  And, the FARC did not even 
show up to the negotiations.  In the short-term of this (4,1) scenario, the government 
would undoubtedly disappoint the public, and in the long-term the Colombian society as 
a whole would incur the costs because it would continue to be embroiled in a never-
ending turbulent conflict and any possibilities of future peace agreements would be 
weakened.  Non-cooperation from the FARC would mean that they would refuse to 
disarm, continue to recruit and to engage in acts of aggression that sabotage the process, 
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and ultimately abandon any possibilities of reintegration.  The bottom right quadrant 
represents a situation where both actors choose non-cooperation.  In this Nash 
equilibrium (2,2) scenario, neither the government nor the FARC is willing to continue 
with the negotiations or follow-through with the agreed concessions.  Again, this would 
have harmful consequences for the future of the nation.  The mutual cooperation in this 
Peace Negotiation Dilemma is key to ensuring that the country can eventually commence 
a reintegration process within a true post-conflict environment.  
 Placing both the reintegration process and the peace process under the lens of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates the possible outcomes of a process, like the 
reintegration process or the peace process, that requires cooperation from both parties for 
the optimal results.  The results of the Peace Negotiation Dilemma will undoubtedly 
influence the behavior of individuals in the Reintegration Dilemma: a non-cooperation 
from either party could potentially delay the signing of any agreement, dissuade the other 
party from continuing with the negotiations and disincentivize bottom-level cooperation 
in the Reintegration Dilemma.  In the mutual cooperation quadrant (3,3) the benefits for 
both parties would be maximized and the society would benefit overall.  In both the (1,4) 
and the (4,1) quadrants, the actor who does not cooperate receives the highest benefit—
explaining why an actor would be incentivized to opt for non-cooperation when the other 
actor cooperates.  In the (2,2) Nash equilibrium, “the payment matrix shows that the 
players are in a situation called Nash’s equilibrium because no one can unilaterally 
improve his payoff.  That is, cooperation from the other is needed so as to get a better 
payoff” (73).   
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II. The Eight Dimensions of Reintegration 
As previously mentioned, society is not an entity.  The individual experiences, 
motivations and incentives of victims and victimizers add to the complexity of the 
reintegration process and the willingness of each party to cooperate.  Using Axelrod’s 
Prisoner’s Dilemma framework and economic literature on behavior change and 
incentives allows a better understanding of not only the possible actions, but also of the 
optimal actions of individuals in the post-conflict phase.  Mutual cooperation and a pro-
social behavior will strengthen the reintegration process.  Through a shared narrative of 
suffering, trauma and hope, the following section will use the voices of victims and ex-
combatants to illustrate the eight dimensions of reintegration and demonstrate the 
complexity of achieving the optimal cooperation-cooperation scenario at the bottom 
level, the community and the individual level.   
The reintegration process has eight dimensions: personal, productive, family, 
habitability, health, educational, citizen, and security.  Through these eight dimensions, 
the ACR plans to develop a life plan for each ex-combatant, which is a scheme that 
agrees with the individual’s options and life project.  A life project is catered to an 
individual’s needs and is essential to an individual’s reintegration route (ACR 2015).   
Personal 
In the personal dimension, the priorities are mental health and establishing social, 
interpersonal and group relationships that improve the ex-combatant’s quality of life.  
The person’s life experiences or the way in which she interprets her reality affect her 
interactions in her civil context.  Ex-combatant narratives point to experiences of 
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desolation, poverty, suffering, violence, abuse, and a lack of a stable family structure.  
Upon reflection on her motives to join the guerrilla, ex-combatant Alejandra states, “A 
combination of my wretched life, their initial speeches, feeling that I wasn’t alone and 
that they would protect and support me, moved me to say ‘yes’ to the guerrilla” (Ardila 
Galvis 176).  In fact, according to the first-hand narratives of female ex-combatants in 
“Voces de jovenes excombatientes,” various women joined the armed groups because 
they had been abused sexually and/or emotionally by family members, others had had 
problems with their boyfriends, and others thought that by joining the guerrilla they 
would have the opportunity to travel, see new places, meet new people and escape from 
their dismal realities (Keairns 48).  While in the armed groups, ex-combatants 
experienced gruesome realities filled with routine, abuse, death and desolation (Keairns 
25-27).  The life experiences of ex-combatants before having joined an armed group and 
their experiences as active combatants add to a baggage of trauma that must be 
considered and addressed as part of the personal dimension of reintegration, since it 
affects their mental health and their future interaction with receiving communities, which 
will most likely include victims.   
Like ex-combatants, victims have been traumatized by violence and are trying to 
conciliate their past horrors to a present where they have to interact with members of the 
armed groups responsible for their suffering, distressing memories and current realities.  
The harrowing narratives of victims in Throwing Stones at the Moon: Narratives from 
Colombians Displaced by Violence are a testament to the carnage and pain in the lives of 
many Colombians.  Their insurmountable strength is admirable.  In this personal 
dimension of reintegration, considering the personal experiences of ex-combatants and 
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victims, it is difficult to fathom a cooperative scenario where interpersonal relations are 
developed.  Neither side’s trauma nor pain can be dismissed.    
Productive 
 In the productive dimension, the goal is to ensure that ex-combatants strengthen 
their skills and capacities to have the means of generating sustainable incomes within a 
legal framework.  Some ex-combatants are not interested in the prospect of working and 
are unwilling to assume working conditions, like 34-year-old male ex-combatant noted:  
There are people who were in the group because of laziness, vengeance, 
convenience, so [in the reintegration phase] they continue to do similar things.  In 
the program there are people who don’t want anything, they prefer to do what is 
easy (Mejía 124)  
A lack of job opportunities and a lack of marketable working skills also pose problems 
for the productivity dimension.  An ex-combatant from the FARC and the AUC said that 
without job opportunities and with a family to feed and a landlord about to kick them out, 
some demobilized individuals “go sell vice and do whatever” (Mejía 124).  For ex-
combatants, generating sustainable incomes is also challenging because of the high 
unemployment and lack of opportunities in Colombian society overall.   
Family 
 
 In the family dimension, the ACR aims to empower the ex-combatants and their 
nuclear family to build up a family support system.  Familial links are indispensible in 
helping the ex-combatants remain in legality in the long term.  Yet often within family 
narratives of ex-combatants, divided loyalties and changing relationships are found 
(Keairns 29).  Unstable family relationships not only led to childhood traumas, but also 
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impelled ex-combatants to join the armed forces, so conciliating with family ties is 
delicate.  Socorro, an ex-combatant whose family was threatened by the guerrilla (ELN) 
and was eventually displaced before joining an armed group, is in solitude without a 
strong family unit to support her pain.  She acknowledges: 
Pain repentance, embarrassment, solitude and orphaned children is all I have left 
from a struggle of less than virtuous means, I was also left with the pain of us 
women who are neither widows nor married.  We are half-married, half-widows, 
half-dead, half-alive.  My children are the children of a disappeared 
man…They’re children of a half-dead, half-alive, half-assasinated, half-
disappeared man.  They’re children abandoned without love (Ardila Galvis 45). 
Civilians, like fifty-five year-old Carmenza Gómez, had her family torn apart by 
violence, as one of her sons was shot within the “false positive” scandal and another was 
killed as he tried to investigate his brother’s death (Brodzinksky 191-209).  Whether 
having had complicated family relationships or having had their family torn by violence, 
both sides, civilians and ex-combatants, have stories of pain and cry for family support.    
Habitability 
 
The habitability dimension was designed to encourage the ex-combatants and 
their families to recognize the importance of maintaining decent living conditions and 
develop their capacities to improve their living conditions in accordance to their cultural 
and socio-economic context.  Transitioning from having lived in the jungle for years to 
living in an urban context is difficult.  Ex-combatants reported that access to housing was 
a key element of the reintegration process, since they felt that housing would generate 
greater stability to their return to civil life and legality (Mejia 112).  Within the various 
accounts of ex-combatants and victims in The Heart of the War, one of the common 
themes is a desire to have land, to have a house, to have property to call their own.     
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Health 
 
The health dimension refers to the development of a healthy lifestyle.  An armed 
conflict greatly impacts an individual’s physical, mental, and social health.  Female ex-
combatants for example, had their reproductive health conditions forcefully monitored 
while they were part of armed groups—they were forced to take contraceptive injections, 
they were the ones responsible for not becoming pregnant, and if they did, they were 
forced to abort (Keairns 27).  Stepping into civil life will change the health practices of 
ex-combatants hopefully for the better, since maintaining a healthy lifestyle is necessary 
for the development of anyone’s life project (ACR 2016).  
Educational 
 
With the educational dimension, the ACR looks to encourage the abilities of the 
ex-combatants to pursue educational levels that allow them to be productive members of 
society and pursue the development of their desired life projects.  Education is pivotal for 
ex-combatants to enhance the productive dimension of the reintegration process, as most 
have but a basic elementary education, if any. Various ex-combatants had to choose 
between helping their family and studying, and according to accounts of young female 
ex-combatants, family needs were prioritized over education (Keairns 42).  Overall, it 
seems that structural factors, such as having to walk long distances to school without 
having had breakfast, and family obligations, such as having to take care of siblings or 
sick family members, contributed to quitting school (Keairns 41).  Many ex-combatants 
note that the access to education through the reintegration process has been positive and 
key for their self-improvement and their adaptation into civil life (Mejia 108).     
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Citizenship 
 
The goal of the citizenship dimension is to ensure that ex-combatants are able to 
integrate themselves as members of civil society in community contexts.  According to 
the evaluation of the results of the politics of social and economic reintegration for people 
and armed groups operating outside the law in Colombia, 97% of ex-combatants said that 
to be completely reintegrated, it was important for them to feel like they were an active 
part of their respective communities (DNP, 2010).  For ex-combatants to become part of 
civil society, they have to contribute to the creation of spaces of reconciliation between 
communities and themselves by serving eighty hours of community service (ACR).  
Providing community service will also enable the development and improvement of 
interpersonal relations with the receiving communities, as civic involvement will increase 
trust from civilians and will promote a positive image of ex-combatants.  
Security 
 
Finally, in the security dimension, the reintegration process aims to strengthen the 
ex-combatants to prevent recidivism and victimization (ACR 2016).  Security is a post-
demobilization issue that threatens both receiving communities and ex-combatants.  Ex-
combatants are in a “delicate personal security situation” because of their “often 
problematic relation to local communities and their earlier experiences with violence” (E. 
Nussio 581).  They are a threat to security as well as targets of violence.  Recidivism 
occurs without a concrete end to the multilateral armed conflict in Colombia.  Carmen 
Rodriguez, a cook from Antioquia, reveals how demobilized individuals in her 
community return to violence.  She noted:   
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In 2005, right after my son started studying, the gang members participated in the 
Héroes de Granada paramiltary bloc demobilization ceremony.  They went to 
demobilize in the municipality of San Roque and came back even fiercer because 
the government paid them and they could arm themselves even more” 
(Brodzinsky 136). 
 
 This is an instance of recidivism that threatens the security of civilians.  In other 
instances, the security question victimizes ex-combatants themselves.  An ex-paramilitary 
from Barrancabermeja said that he felt insecure being an ex-combatant because “almost 
always when they kill somebody, it’s a demobilized guy” (E. Nussio 580).  The guerrilla, 
the paramilitary, or regular security forces may pose a threat to the lives of demobilized 
individuals.  In the following quote from an ex-combatant, the uncertainty of the security 
threat is exemplified by the use of “they” to depict danger:   
‘Oh my God, they are going to kill the demobilized people!’ You feel afraid then, 
it makes you feel pretty insecure thinking they may come and kill you…You can 
never be trusting. Thinking that the guerrilla, another paramilitary group, or your 
own paramilitary organisation may [ . . . ] That creates an uncertainty so that you 
always have to watch out (E. Nussio 588). 
 
The voices of victims and ex-combatants give insight to the throbbing human 
dimension of the conflict and the multidimensionality of reintegration.  Implementing 
reintegration policies in a society where violence has desecrated the lives of many, 
regardless of the side of the conflict on which they are, will be difficult.   
 
III. Logistics and Steps of the Reintegration Process 
For the reintegration process to be sustainable, it is important that the individual 
understands that he/she is being equipped with the tools, training and knowledge with 
which to become a self-sufficient citizen.  Ensuring the development of self-sufficiency 
or autonomy is important for the success of the process as a transitional program.  As 
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part of the DDR transitional post-conflict process, the reintegration process is not meant 
to be a set of welfare policies on which the demobilized individual has to depend his 
entire life (CONPES, 2008: 65).   
When ex-combatants are self-sufficient they are able to “understand that it is 
possible to materialize their life aspirations in legality” (ACR 2016).  Once they become 
part of the legal framework and mechanism of society, they are able to become active 
citizens with the same civil rights, duties and capacities as any other Colombian citizen.  
This self-sufficiency will likewise enable the long-term socioeconomic development of 
the country since it will allow ex-combatants to be part of a productive working force.  In 
terms of government expenditure on the process of reintegration, self-sufficiency would 
also allow the state to have a greater budget for state building and other areas of 
peacebuilding. 
 Regarding specific goals, the national policy for reintegration states that it aims to 
(1) identify and promote the resolution of the legal situation of the demobilized for them 
to be able to socially and economically reintegrate themselves, (2) support the formation 
of self-sufficient and responsible individuals through psychosocial care and balanced 
management of free time, (3) promote healthy lifestyles through access to the General 
Health and Social Security System, (4) promote the continued attendance in the formal 
educational system, (5) contribute to the construction of skills and abilities that allow ex-
combatants to successfully integrate themselves in the labor market and generate their 
own income (6) promote social harmony, reconciliation, and socially strengthen the 
receiving communities, (7) and strengthen the state policy for reintegration (CONPES 
2008).  
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The reintegration process is both complex and costly.  In a study conducted by 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Research, the implementation cost of a peace 
agreement with the FARC would be at least 1.1% of the GDP (approximately $5.3 
million dollars) at most 3.8% of the GDP (approximately $18.8 million dollars) over the 
span of ten years (Cosoy 2015).  From this expected budget, reintegration would 
supposedly be the least expensive out of the three components included in this cost 
estimation: victims, agriculture reform and rural reconstruction, and ex-combatant 
demobilization and reintegration.  According to the ACR, the attention brought to ex-
combatants for a year requires $5 million Colombian Pesos, which is less than $2000 US 
Dollars, and the process takes on average about 6.5 years (Cosoy 2015; ACR website).  
The 2015 ACR budget was approximately $60 million dollars to serve 30,000 people.  If 
36,000 people demobilized from the FARC at the possible signing of a peace agreement, 
the total cost of their reintegration would be about $468 million dollars (Cosoy 2015).   
Before entering the reintegration phase and receiving the benefits obtained by an 
individual undergoing a reintegration process, an ex-combatant has to receive a CODA 
(Comité Operativo de Dejación de Armas) to certify his status as a desmovilizado.  To 
receive this certification, an ex-combatant must first report to a civil authority, hand over 
weapons, enter the PAHD (Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado), 
receive housing, food, clothing and health care, and move to Hogares de Paz.  These 
Hogares de Paz are temporary shelters administered by the Group for Demobilized 
Humanitarian Attention of the Ministry of Defense (GAHD) and provide psychosocial 
attention, training, identification documents, legal advice, health evaluations, sports and 
recreation for the demobilized individuals and their family group (ACR 2016).  If the 
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demobilized individual is able to undergo this pre-reintegration phase, he obtains the 
CODA.  The CODA is his passport into receiving the benefits of reintegration from the 
ACR since it states the demobilized condition of the individual.   
After obtaining the CODA the demobilized citizen officially enters the route for 
reintegration through the ACR (ACR 2016).  The second step is health, where the ACR 
makes sure the ex-combatant and his family become covered by health insurance.  The 
third step is psychosocial care, where individuals undergo activities that allow them to 
feel better with the people around them.  The fourth step is education, where the 
individual and his family are given the means for education.   The fifth step is job 
training, where the ultimate goal is for the individual to emerge with a stable job or his 
own business.  The sixth step is economic insertion, where the ACR can invest to help 
them start their own business, continue their studies, or buy their own house.  The 
seventh step consists of legal help, which means that the ACR helps the individual with 
the paperwork that they need to receive their legal benefits.  After these steps, it is the 
end of the reintegration route.  These steps would work through a federal budget 
(Presupuesto ACR 2016).  
The steps of the reintegration process are not merely steps in a checklist that if 
followed ensure a successful reintegration into a new environment.  It is important to 
understand that each ex-combatant’s lived experience is unique and his or her new reality 
will vary depending on the people with whom they interact and their own personal 
attributes, such as their internal dispositions to change, their attitudinal responses to 
rejection, stigmatization and challenges, and their willingness to break with a past that 
will continue to follow them internally and externally.  These members of society are 
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entering a new reality where they will not necessarily be welcomed with open arms.  
They are entering a polarized context that is wounded and is searching for justice—a 
subjective and difficult concept that is often punitive and retaliatory.  This is often not the 
most nurturing environment for ex-combatants, or rather ex-guerrilleros, ex-
paramilitaries, desmovilizados.  The labels alone are capable of silencing a conversation 
and evoking hate, fear, and disappointment in the government.  Needless to say, the 
reintegration process, as noble as it might seem and as integral to a sustainable peace as it 
is, experiences some challenges.  
IV. Challenges 
The challenges of the reintegration phase induce great skepticism among citizens 
weary of war and wary of both insurgent groups and government brokers of peace.  For 
one, as aforementioned, the conflict has not ended.  This poses one of the greatest 
challenges to the success of the reintegration process.  Colombia is not in post-conflict, 
but rather in pre-post-conflict, which further encumbers the ex-combatant’s adaptation to 
a new reality.  This difficulty is evident when considering the conditions that a person in 
process of reintegration finds in the sociocultural context that receives him once he 
abandons an illegal armed group (GAI).  The social context is one in which the 
demobilized confronts various adversities, like unemployment, poverty, a culture of 
inmediatismo económico, social inequality, delinquency and the constant offers of 
illegality coming from his former armed group or from emerging illegal armed groups 
(Mejia 9). 
How is it even viable to reintegrate individuals who once belonged to armed 
Pico 48 
groups into a society that continues to be at war with other—or perhaps the same—armed 
groups?  Taking this in mind, if an ex-combatant did not formally belong to a group that 
has made a formal agreement, how can he feel safe from repercussions if he decides to 
desert and join civil society?  On the side of civil society, how can we expect the 
cooperation and willingness of the receiving communities, selling them a post-conflict 
concept, when they do not see a concrete end and perceive continued aggression from the 
other armed groups as a signal that the state has not effectively defeated violence?    
Danger of Recidivism 
In this pre-post-conflict phase other challenges that arise because of the 
continuation of armed illegal groups is the “the availability of resources or income from 
illegal drug trafficking, with which armed groups can be financed” (Casas and Guzman 
54).  The availability of financing continues to strengthen these groups, lessening their 
incentives for engaging in DDR processes.  Additionally, the continuation of an illegal 
gun market not only hinders the Disarmament part of the DDR process, but also 
complicates the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society.  The availability of 
illegal resources, like money from drug trafficking and a market for arms, reverses the 
efforts of ex-combatants to break-off from violence because it incentivizes them to return 
to violence—these illegal resources are saboteurs that can affect the process of 
reintegration and can create parallel institutional universes where violence is the means to 
solve problems (CONPES 25; Casas and Guzman 79).  
Recidivism, or the reengagement in violence and the entering into criminal 
structures by ex-combatants, is one of the challenges of a DDR process that occurs 
amidst continued violence (FIP, 2014: 5).  In fact, the research team of the organization 
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Foundation Ideas for Peace (FIP) conducted a study about the return to legality or 
recidivism of ex-combatants.  Based on their results, they created a combined index with 
three measurements for whether ex-combatants reverted into violence: [ex-combatants] 
never approached [by armed groups], approached but not tempted, approached and 
tempted.  The index showed that 20% of the ex-combatant population in Colombia is 
completely reintegrated into civil society, 42% is at a low-intermediate risk, 14% has a 
medium-high risk and 24% is recidivist.  The FIP concluded that among the ex-
combatant population there is a group of recidivist ex-combatants, a group of ex-
combatants that have reintegrated successfully into civilian life and another group that is 
“potentially vulnerable to recidivism or recruitment, or vulnerable to falling into the gray 
zone of non-recidivism.”  The research affirms the importance of promoting and offering 
ex-combatants relations, social capital and networks in the reintegration process.  
Consistent involvement in the reintegration program is crucial to prevent recidivism.   
A risk factor that increases the danger of recidivism, as well as victimization, of 
ex-combatants is continuing in geographic zones with FARC, Bacrim (criminal bands), 
or narcotrafficking (ACR 2016).  This risk factor demonstrates that being an ex-
combatant attempting to find a new life in a violent context defeats the purpose of 
reintegration.  In a context that continues to de-legitimize the state institutions and 
continues to favor violence as an alternative to democracy, where violence at a macro and 
micro level remains the undisputed status quo, reengaging in violence seems like a 
rational course of action for an ex-combatant who wants to maximize his short-term gains 
and utility.  With the continuation of armed groups amidst attempts of reintegration, the 
state’s legitimacy and control is put into question.  The cultural rule has been to resort to 
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violence to assert one’s legitimacy, rather than resorting to the state institutions, so when 
the state has not clearly ruptured with war in a macroscopic scale, it has not effectively 
broken the cycle of violence or mistrust in Colombia’s democracy.     
Other obstacles include the ex-combatant profile.  The demobilized has an 
uncertain judicial situation, since he does not have civil registration or a civil 
identification (CONPES 19).  He also has little to no job experience and training, which 
makes it difficult for them to enter a workforce with already scarce opportunities.  In 
terms of lack of opportunities, the private sector does not assume the social responsibility 
of increasing employment opportunities by supporting productive initiatives that link all 
the actors from armed violence to a civil life (CONPES 22).   
 
V. Key Aspects of the Reintegration Process 
Taking into account the various challenges and gaps of the reintegration process, 
it is important to consider certain key aspects.  The psychological and education 
components are some of the most important areas because they ensure that the process is 
sustainable and contributes to long-term peace building.  Furthermore, building a skillset 
for joining the workforce is integral to the economic strategy of reintegration, since the 
construction abilities and the development of job skills and entrepreneurship is necessary 
for the ex-combatants to successfully enter the labor market and become autonomous 
(CONPES 29). 
Because of the transitional nature of the reintegration process, it is also key for the 
programs to have the support of regional and local politics to ensure effective 
implementation of the policies and the cooperation of the receiving communities 
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(CONPES 65).  This support of the receiving communities is part of the idea of 
corresponsabilidad, in which all segments of society need to be linked and assume 
responsibility to be able to build relationships based on trust, conciliation and reciprocity.  
Corresponsabilidad is “an interdependent and dynamic development requiring the 
cooperation of the entire social group to thrive” (Croll 2003: 50).  As shown in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma previously, the cooperation of the receiving communities is key for 
the reintegration process, and so the process must also prioritize the rehabilitation of 
society to guarantee receptiveness.  Although the ex-combatants are subjected and given 
the tools for a transition of realities, “the social is not” (Theidon 2007: 77).  Reintegration 
not only requires that the ex-combatants cooperate, consent and are willing to learn, but 
also requires that the society learns “to live with those who have participated in the 
conflict” which places this situation as a problem of collective action (Casas and Guzman 
72).  Effective reintegration implies a qualitative change in the receiving communities 
and this is only possible if crucial aspects of the host communities, including local 
cultures, psychology, and in-group/out-group dynamics, are considered (Casas and 
Guzman 59).   
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Third Chapter: The Politics of Peacemaking  
 
 
Source: Eltiempo.com 
Symbolic handshake between President Santos and FARC’s leader, Timochenko, 
mediated by Raul Castro. 
 
 In the larger context of peace making, no analysis of DDR is complete without 
understanding the politics of peace making, especially in the case of Colombia, when the 
FARC and the government have held peace dialogues in Havana since 2012.  The 
dilemma of reintegration and peace negotiations is interconnected, as the policies of DDR 
are dependent on the politics at the table in Havana.  Likewise, DDR policies are not 
being nor will they be implemented in a vacuum—they are subject to national politics 
and events, which also affect the politics of the peace negotiations. Thus, to better 
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understand the theory and the policy behind DDR, we must examine the interconnectivity 
of the politics of peacemaking with national politics and events.  This permits a more 
realistic view on the complexity of DDR implementation, as Colombia is in a scenario of 
conflicted interests and high political stakes.  The following chapter will examine the 
current peace negotiations and the winding road to a failed deadline through current 
events and political scandals.   
 
I. The Motives Behind the March 23rd Deadline 
Half a century after the start of Colombia’s civil war, President Santos and the 
FARC would sign a peace agreement on March 23rd, 2016 that would be remembered in 
history.  Six months before, the President and the leader of the FARC shook hands in 
Havana promising Colombians that by that date a peace agreement would be finalized, 
followed by disarmament sixty days later.  The handshake in Havana occurred amidst 
debates about impunity in Colombia and a continued high distrust of the FARC: 93% of 
Colombians have an unfavorable opinion of the FARC (Gallup 2015).  This sudden 
announcement begged questions about the motivations and the tangibility of such an 
ambitious deadline when the distance between the actors in certain issues and certain 
points within the peace agenda remained evident. 
The decision of the negotiators to announce a concrete deadline for the signature 
of the peace agreement at that specific point in 2015 could also be due to diminishing 
public opinion of the peace process and diminishing presidential approval ratings.  In 
other words, the government’s performance and public opinion could have prompted 
such an announcement and a willingness to expedite the process.  
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Regarding public opinion of the process, in the latest poll made by Gallup, by 
June 2015, 62% of Colombians did not believe that an agreement with the FARC that 
ended the armed conflict could be made, while 33% believed it was possible.  Although 
the results showed that 54% of Colombians agreed with having started the peace 
negotiations with the FARC, this was the lowest number since the beginning of the 
dialogues in 2012.  73.4% of Colombians believed that the peace process was heading in 
the wrong direction and only 18% believed that it was on a good path (Gomez 2015).  
Moreover, 45% of Colombians believed that peace dialogues were the best option, while 
46% believed that a military offensive is necessary to defeat the guerrilla, which can be 
related to the fact that 77% saw the situation with the guerrilla worsening, while 12% said 
that it was improving—the first time since the negotiations in 2012 that the public 
favored a military strategy over peace negotiations.   
This low point in the opinion of the peace negotiations was due to a critical series 
of events in 2015 that, according to Jorge Restrepo, “meant a crisis for the process” (BBC 
Mundo 2015).  In May 22, 2015 the military attacked the FARC, killing 26 combatants, 
to which the FARC responded by ending the unilateral ceasefire agreed in the 
negotiations: in less than a month the FARC started targeting and killing military 
members again and intensified their attacks against civilian infrastructures (Lafuente 
2015).  One of the most shocking attacks was the FARC’s surprise attack on an army 
patrol in Cauca, in which they killed eleven soldiers. In light of this attack, the entire 
nation “expressed its dismay and indignation in light of such a bloody and 
incomprehensible ambush that no one has been able to explain…in any case, everyone 
coincided in that the [peace] process had been seriously wounded”(Semana 2015).  After 
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this attack and others, before the Gallup poll was conducted in June, the overall opinion 
of the peace negotiations, the belief in the end of the conflict, and the public’s trust had 
plummeted.  It is clear that the public was not able to digest this latest return to violence 
despite the fact that the conflict had been previously deescalating.    
Public opinion of Santos has dropped mightily since he took office in 
2010.  According to a graph in Colombia Reports based on data from CNC, Datexco, 
Gallup, and Ipsos, Santos’ approval rating has plummeted, with public ire directed at the 
peace negotiations, the economy, and his overall management of the government.  By 
looking at the various data we can see that across all four one can see a dip from around 
May 2015 to after September 2015—meaning that across all four, the approval rating was 
on an overall steady decline and then it rose up somewhat after on the dates after the 
announcement of the March 23rd 2016 deadline, even though it has continued to decrease 
afterwards.  A poll from Gallup also revealed the unfavorable opinion that the public 
holds of the president: by June 2015, 66% of Colombians disapproved of the work that 
the President had done, while only 28% supported his work, which could explain why the 
presidency was eager to demonstrate progress in the peace dialogue by setting a deadline. 
 
 
Santos Approval Rating 
http://colombiareports.com/santos-approval-rating-sinks-to-28-gallup/		
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The government aimed to inject optimism and trust into the public’s minds—a 
symbolic action that would reinvigorate a lengthy and exhaustive peace process that was 
depleting people’s patience.  Regardless of the motives, setting the date renewed the hope 
of many, the hope that this process, which has polarized the country, would be different 
and effective instead of one more disappointment deriding the government and people.  
However, the deadline was not met.  
 
From a Democratic Security Policy to Peace Negotiations in Havana 
After success in reducing violence during the Uribe administration with the Plan 
Colombia, the change in presidency led to a change in policy intended to end a stalemate 
and initiate a new plan of action that would take advantage of the FARC’s 
weakening.  The government of Uribe had been highly successful in the military fight 
against the FARC, to the point that in 2008 talk of post-conflict arose.  The reduced 
numbers of guerrilla, the reduced homicides and kidnappings during the Uribe presidency 
indicated that the war war being won militarily were the reduced (Leech 
2005).  According to Air Force General Juan Carlos Gomez, the government had been 
successful in the democratic security policy and had eradicated and eliminated the 
guerrilla in many regions of the country, debilitating them to the point of making them 
irrelevant, thus enabling the government to advance in the politics of post-conflict to 
guarantee that this violent and terrorist phenomenon would not affect our country ever 
again (2016).  At the end of his second term President Uribe passed the baton into the 
hands of the Minister of Defense at the time, Juan Manuel Santos.  Yet Santos 
dramatically changed the course of action from a hardline military strategy to a peace 
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dialogue negotiation—a shift in policy that many people in Colombia considered 
treasonous.  When Santos entered the presidency, the military’s effectiveness had been 
dropping, while that of the guerrilla had been increasing; the conflict was reaching a 
stalemate with its military strategy (Anselma 2014).  Nevertheless, why would Santos, a 
member Uribe’s own party, curtail the strategy that had not only weakened the FARC, 
but had also maintained Uribe between a 68% and 86% performance approval rating? 
During the years before the beginning of the 2012 peace negotiations, various 
important FARC leaders died, which led to changes in leadership and the weakening of 
the FARC.  This factor, which might have caused the FARC to be more willing to 
negotiate and contemplate a peace agreement, is known as actor 
transformation.  According to theorists of conflict, actor transformation is part of five 
generic transformers of protracted conflict that explain the ways in which conflict 
transformation takes place, positing that when a shift in leadership occurs, a change of 
direction resulting in a new delineation of policies, goals, and perspectives is inevitable 
(Ramsbotham 176).  In 2008, Manuel Marulanda, also known as Tirofijo, one of the 
FARC’s main leaders and founders, died of natural causes.  Tirofijo’s death created 
uncertainty and debilitated the group’s prospects for future endeavors (Nullvalue 2008).  
Two years later, in the “Operation Sodoma,” the armed forces killed a top FARC 
commander Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, also known as Mono Jojoy (El Tiempo 2010).  
The next year, in 2011, the leader who had replaced Tirofijo, Alfonso Cano, was killed in 
a military raid.  This death had a great psychological impact for the FARC because he 
had been the their second commander-in-chief.  President Santos called it “the most 
devastating blow to the group in its decades-long insurgency and urged it to disband” 
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(McDermott 2011).  Keeping this actor transformation in mind, as well as the military 
successes, the beginning of the peace negotiations seemed to be at a ripe moment.   
One of the principal reasons for retrenchment on military pursuit of the FARC 
was the rising level of human rights violations. During Uribe’s Democratic Security 
Policy, tens of thousands of civilians were killed or victimized and millions were 
displaced (Anselma 2014).  The False Positive scandal, a controlled crime of systematic 
execution, tainted the military strategy of the Uribe administration in the eyes of the 
nation and the world. 
Between 2002 and 2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed 
civilians. Under pressure from superiors to show “positive” results and boost body 
counts in their war against guerrillas, soldiers and officers abducted victims or 
lured them to remote locations under false pretenses—such as with promises of 
work—killed them, placed weapons on their lifeless bodies, and then reported 
them as enemy combatants killed in action. Committed on a large scale for more 
than half a decade, these “false positive” killings constitute one of the worst 
episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere in recent decades (Human 
Rights Watch 2015). 
 
President Santos was the defense minister when the False Positive Scandal, came 
to light in 2008.  Between 2002 and 2009, more than 3,000 extrajudicial executions 
occurred due to the commencement of the Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy.  Civil 
organizations and the family members of the young men killed in the False Positive 
scandal considered that these crimes were attributable to the government’s policy of 
compensating military forces as an incentive to fight against the guerrilla.  They held 
Juan Manuel Santos as one of the perpetrators of the crimes and thus said it was 
unprecedented for him to be in the presidential elections of 2010 (El Espectador 2010).  
Furthermore, since Santos stated that he put an end to this type of executions, according 
to the columnist Felipe Zuleta, it demonstrated that the False Positives was a crime whose 
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execution was controlled and obeyed a criminal enterprise that was finitely 
established.  In one way or another, whether he was actually one of the culprits or not, 
President Santos was implicated in this massive human rights violation scandal, 
something detrimental for his image, as well as the trust of his constituents.  Changing 
the course of Uribe’s military democratic security policy would be Santos’ chance of 
eradicating any link he had had with the scandal—changing from a military offensive to a 
peaceful dialogue, from a violent tactic to a peaceful one, would establish him as a 
groundbreaking peacemaker in the eyes of the nation and the international sphere.   
 
Short-lived Optimism 
A year after the beginning of the peace talks in Havana, María Vicoria Llorente, 
director of the Foundation of Ideas for Peace (FIP)—a Colombian foundation created to 
increase awareness, to propose resolutions to the armed conflict and to build peace by 
keeping in mind the people’s human rights, supremacy and plurality—stated, “The FIP 
considers that this peace process is, probably, from all the processes with the FARC, the 
one that has major elements with which to sign an agreement that will lead to 
disarmament” (Llorente 2013).  Early on, the FARC’s willingness to negotiate for peace 
was illustrated by their statement in August 2013, in which they recognized for the first 
time in their history that they are partly responsible for the thousands of victims in the 
conflict, suggesting that steps be taken for the relief and compensation of the victims 
(AFP 2013).  Needless to say, this latest peace attempt by the Santos administration 
seemed to be different.  Talks of post-conflict policy and implementation seemed not 
only appropriate but also progressive and promising, elevating the Colombian effort to 
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the world stage and garnering support from international actors, such as the United 
Nations, the European Union, and the United States. 
The Winding Road to the Deadline 
Since the announcement of the deadline, the road has been turbulent.  Recent 
events leading to March 2016 have demoralized the country and demonstrated a lack of 
commitment to peace and nation building from various segments of society.  The 
conditions in the country have not been conducive to cooperation, which in turn has made 
Colombians pessimistic.  Less than a fourth of the population considers that the country 
is going in the right direction, and this pessimism is demonstrated in the negative opinion 
that they have of Juan Manuel Santos’ image and his government, the credibility of 
institutions and the expectations of the peace process (Semana 2016, C).  The results 
from a study conducted by Semana reveal the negative and chaotic moment that 
Colombia is experiencing amidst this latest critical peace agreement: economic decline, 
corruption scandals, political polarization and acts of armed politics by the FARC.  
First, the economy is faltering.  Exports fell by 36.6%, unemployment is in the 
double digits at 11.9%, the dollar is high, the minimum wage was badly set, consumer 
and inflation is over 6%, Real GDP has been decreasing since 2013, and the value-added 
national tax, the IVA (Impuesto de Valor Agregado), rose from 16% to 19% (Hernandez 
2016; World Bank 2016; Dinero 2015).  The increase in the IVA, according to experts, 
will affect the prices of products in the basket of goods, at a critical moment in the 
economy (Dinero 2015).  The Colombian government is looking for a structural tax 
reform to increase its revenue for its 2016 policies, including post-conflict policies 
(Bluradio 2015).  The peace process and the subsequent post-conflict are being used as 
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motives for the needed revenue and thus the necessity of increasing the IVA.  But 
Colombians are not enjoying this revenue game, as their belief in the legitimacy and 
feasibility of the peace process is faltering, which would consequently make this increase 
unnecessary.   
As the deadline approached, the economic situation frustrated and disillusioned 
Colombians, prompting doubt in the effectiveness of the Santos administration.  In March 
17, 2016 the apparent public discontent on the economic situation was manifested in a 
series of protests around the country: thousands of Colombians took to the streets to 
protest President Santos’ economic policies at a crucial time in the peace negotiations, the 
final stretch or rather what seemed to be (Lafuente 2016).  
The demonstrators also decried the “recent sale of state-owned electric company 
Isagen and the scandal over massive cost overruns in the modernization of the Reficar oil 
refinery in Cartagena” (EFE 2016).  The sale of the state-owned Isagen to the Canadian 
company Brookfield, in which the Minister of Finance was involved, occurred at moment 
when the country is on the verge of an energy shortage.  This privatization, the largest in 
Colombia in almost a decade, raised questions about the regularity and the legality of the 
transaction (América Economía 2016). 
Another corruption scandal erupted in January 2016, when the Office of the 
Comptroller General of the Republic exposed the high costs and the poor execution of the 
upgrading of Reficar, in which execution errors doubled the expected costs in less than 
five years.  During the construction of this project, delays in the operations and 
corruption in contracting practices led to a dramatic fall in the expected profitability and 
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losses of millions of dollars to Reficar and to the state, since the refinery belongs to the 
primary petroleum Colombian company, Ecopetrol (Semana 2016, D).  
A male prostitution scandal involving the Colombian National Police and 
Congress was yet another corruption scandal in 2016 that undermined the legality of 
Colombian government institutions—more specifically, that continued to taint the 
public’s opinion of the Santos administration and thus of the peace process.  In this 
scandal, General Rodolfo Palomino, resigned from his post as the general director of the 
National Police after months of allegations and accusations for the possible illegal 
monitoring and interception of journalists, the unjustified increase of assets, and the 
creation and operation of a prostitution network that supposedly operated within the 
Congress and the police department (Cosoy 2016).  These scandals have reiterated the 
government’s incompetence and corruption—they have unraveled what continues to be a 
common theme in Colombia’s government at an inconvenient moment when national 
unity and public credibility is in danger.  The nation is polarized. 
The peace process has divided the nation between Santistas and Uribistas—those 
who support the Santos administration and his plan of combatting the nation’s conflict 
through peace dialogues and those against Santos who rally behind the hard-liner 
President Uribe who calls the peace agreement an “Agreement of Impunity.”  President 
Uribe has tapped into the “current fear and opposition to negotiations” and the fact that 
“many people want FARC guerrillas prosecuted for their crimes and thrown in jail, not 
let off if they admit to what they have done” (Partlow 2015).  The accusation and the 
capture of Uribe’s brother, Santiago Uribe, for aggravated homicide and conspiracy 
related to an illegal armed group deepened the division between Santos and Uribe (El 
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Tiempo 2016).  President Uribe claims that Santiago Uribe was politically persecuted 
simply because of being his brother.  He even denounced the capture to the Inter-
American Comission on Human Rights, claiming that his family was being 
“persecuted.”  Uribistas allege that this is evidence of a deliberate political persecution, 
while the government assures that it was an autonomous decision of the Prosecutor.   
The path to the signing of the peace agreement has not only been complicated by 
government scandals and polarization, but also by actions of the FARC.  In 2015, 
according to the UN, the FARC was responsible for the largest percentage of displaced 
Colombians: from the estimated 166,000 Colombians displaced, 37% fled from the 
FARC, as opposed to 31% from the ELN, and 13% from criminal gangs (Victim’s Unit 
1; “Forced Displacement…” 4).  Closer to the deadline, an episode of armed political 
proselytism in the town of Conejo on February 2016 reflects the continuing differences 
between the FARC and the government, as well as the FARC’s unwillingness to 
cooperate with the concessions in the peace agreement.  A delegation of the guerrilla, led 
by Ivan Marquez, met at Conejo.  The meeting was problematic because it took place in 
the urban area of the municipality in the presence of both civilians and guerrilleros, and 
also because according to the government, it violated the agreed concession of not mixing 
arms and politics under any circumstance (Molano 2016).  The FARC took this 
opportunity to make political speeches and to criticize the concessions that President 
Santos had been offering them in Havana (Molano 2016; Semana 2016, B).  Needless to 
say, this untimely event in Conejo unleashed criticism on the government’s concessions 
with the FARC in Havana, pointing to the need to clearly define the parameters of 
political exercise, pedagogical work and the relation between the guerrilla and civil 
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society (Molano 2016).  The motives of the FARC in the peace process were likewise 
questioned, as their actions were considered an “institutional challenge” (Semana 2016, 
B) 
The winding road to March 23rd accentuated the differences between the FARC 
and the government, between peace process supporters and non-peace supporters, 
between Santistas and Uribistas, between policy and politics.  At a time when the country 
was supposedly nearing a historic agreement, the previous examples reaffirmed the 
complexity of Colombian politics and social structure.  Colombia might have a latent 
capacity and willingness to undergo a post-conflict phase and resolve a prolonged 
conflict where violence, corruption, and narcotrafficking have asserted themselves as the 
immutable status quo.  Yet being pessimistic (or perhaps realistic), the turbulent winding 
road to March 23rd show that once again, Colombia’s political, social, and economic 
inherent structure continues to hold it hostage in a cycle of violence and 
disappointments.  Signing a peace agreement is not an easy task, and the efforts of those 
at Havana to create policy on which the government and its longest nemesis can agree is 
commendable, but will the policies coincide with the politics?  The FARC’s idea of a 
satisfactory end of the conflict continued to differ with the government’s idea—and to a 
greater extent, with the public’s idea—within mere weeks of signing the definitive 
deal.  It is not surprising that the deadline was changed.     
 
II. Failure to Meet the Deadline 
On March 9th and 10th, the promise of a signed peace agreement on the 23rd 
seemed elusive: the government and the FARC, respectively, issued statements saying 
Pico 65 
that they were willing to set a new deadline to ensure that the agreement was optimal for 
everyone (AFP 2016; Pereira 2016).  President Santos noted, “Despite the shared interest 
of reaching a definitive act that leads to the reincorporation of guerrilla members into the 
civil life of the country, I would not sign an agreement with the FARC that would not be 
a good agreement for Colombians”(Redacción Paz 2016).  
The symbolic and saccharin handshake at Havana had been futile.  Allaying 
public disappointment, the government recognized the impossibility of having met the 
deadline when major differences between the FARC and the government remained—
differences critical to peace.  The differences stemmed from disagreements on 
disarmament deadlines, the entry of the FARC into politics and civil life, the concessions 
of the zones of concentration, and security guarantees.  Overall they were all related to 
disarmament.  
 
The Distance that Remains 
The most crucial disagreement on disarmament that prevents the signing of the 
peace agreement is the differing opinion of disarmament as a prerequisite to the FARC 
members’ entry into politics and into civil life.  The government demands a set and 
concrete date to end the process of disarmament, since it sees legality as a prerequisite for 
the FARC to potentially engage in politics, circulate in national territory, and enter civil 
life.  The head of the Government delegation, Humberto de la Calle, insisted on “a 
process of disarmament with fixed deadlines, without any gray zones, without the mix of 
arms and politics, a disarmament that will take place for the international stage in 
complete transparency.  There can be no doubt about the decision of the disposal of 
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arms” (Molano 2016).  The FARC, however, wants disarmament to be a gradual process 
and wants to be able to engage in politics and civil life once the agreement is signed, not 
after a set date of disarmament (Redacción Paz 2016).  Alluding to the necessity of arms, 
Timochenko warned that the FARC was going to enter political life and needed a 
guarantee to stay alive in order to do so (Molano 2016).  Disarmament can be seen as a 
security issue. 
Furthermore, the FARC and the government’s views on zonas de concentración 
continue to differ.   These zones are temporary location areas that will enable the FARC 
members to transition into civility and legality, as they will report here after the accords 
are signed to carry out the processes of disarmament, demobilization and the special 
measures of justice until the government determines the end of the process.  The 
government intends to have eleven zones, limited to at most ten square kilometers in size, 
in regions with the least population possible, without schools and with community police 
free to carry out their functions (Monsalve 2016).  The government will restrict the 
carrying of arms to 5% in these zones and hand over the rest to an international body.  
Within these areas, the arrest warrants against the FARC members would be null, and for 
the FARC to be able to exit them, they would require permission from the government 
and the UN (Molano 2016).   
The FARC disagreed with the government’s guidelines for the disarmament 
procedures in the zonas de concentración, and this disagreement was augmented when 
the government forbade the FARC from conducting any meetings with civilians within 
the zonas de concentración and from engaging in political proselytism without 
permission from the Executive.  Instead, the FARC’s idea for these zones is for them to 
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be located within villages with communication and water supplies and defined by 
“geographic accidents”.  They want to be able to hold meetings with civilians with at 
most 300 people.  Likewise, the arms should be identified through technical processes, 
with a percentage deposited in warehouses within the zones, a percentage handed over to 
the UN, and a percentage given to ex-combatants to ensure their security (Molano 
2016).    
Continuing to disagree on disarmament will undo the progress that has been made 
during these four years, as arms are at the core of this fifty-year conflict.  For the FARC, 
disarmament is a delicate issue, as it is through arms that they have been able to conduct 
their operations and remain powerful, so succumbing to the government’s demands is not 
a simple task as it strips them of the means through which they have been able to enforce 
their legitimacy/existence.  The FARC is also worried about the security of its 
demobilized members at the latent threat of the paramilitary.  
Yet, disarmament is a condition for post-conflict and the cessation of 
violence.  The elimination of arms will ensure that violence will cease to be a method 
with which to enter politics.  The signature of a peace agreement or the beginning of a 
comprehensive post-conflict phase without eradicating the instruments that allowed it to 
endure is inconceivable—without disarmament, reintegration, the aspect of DDR that 
ensures a long lasting peace, is unfeasible.  The FARC might fear reprisal from 
paramilitary forces, but entering civil life in legality requires no arms.  
Colombia has been undergoing a pre-post-conflict stage without a concrete end of 
the conflict, but if the FARC and the government are aiming for a peace agreement, 
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disarmament must be a priority and a condition for the benefits of a reintegration process 
for the FARC.  
 
The Aftermath of the Failed Deadline 
 
        According press statements, for both the government and the FARC the failure to 
meet the deadline is not synonymous to the end of the process.  Ivan Marquez, the chief 
guerrilla negotiator, promised that they meant “to arrive at the construction of a good 
agreement to make 2016 the year of peace” (Minuto30 2016).  Likewise, close sources to 
the negotiations estimated that the final agreement with the FARC would be signed on 
the last week of June 2016, which would mean that the FARC would start disarmament at 
the beginning of September (Gomez 2016).  After the change of the first deadline, 
general skepticism is inevitable over whether a few more months will be sufficient to 
resolve the deep differences that remain.  
Seven days after the government announced its intention of extending the 
deadline of the peace process with the FARC, President Santos announced his 
government’s intention of beginning a peace process with the second largest guerrilla 
group, the ELN.  In the press release, he reiterated that although each process would be 
different from that of the FARC, “the end of the conflict is one” (Gomez 2016).  Since 
the ELN is weaker than the FARC, it may be interested in going further and faster than 
the FARC—they do not have the same strength with which to bargain concessions with 
the government.  This announcement was coincidentally made two days before the much 
publicized Uribista protests of April 2nd.  Through social networks, Uribe and his 
followers made a call to take to the streets to denounce the Santos presidency for its 
Pico 69 
corruption and its waste of money, to make clear that Colombians do not want the FARC 
to engage in armed politics while talking of peace in Havana, and to demand respect from 
terrorists and the government (Caracol Radio 2016).  The announcement of the peace 
negotiations with the ELN did not prevent, nor quell the protests.         
On April 2nd, in Bogota and twenty-two other cities, thousands of Colombians 
heeded Alvaro Uribe’s call.  A man in the protests said his anger stemmed from the fact 
that the deceitful fraud [Santos] was going to give the country not only to the FARC, but 
now to the ELN as well” (Semana 2016, A).  Instead of the ELN announcement giving a 
surge of hope, it seemed to augment the disappointment in the Santos government.  These 
protests were not just peaceful protests organized by the people, but they were 
politicized.  In other words, they were led and encouraged by ex-president Uribe and his 
political party, Centro Democrático, and directly attacked the Santos presidency and 
politics.  In Bogota, amidst whistles and bugles, chants of “No más Santos” and “Uribe, 
Uribe, Uribe” emerged from the sea of people (Semana 2016, A).  The politicization of 
the protests only deepens the social and political polarization of the country.  And, as 
evidenced by Colombia’s history, political polarization leads to painful and catastrophic 
consequences.  The post-conflict process will not be the only one harmed.  
 
A Critical Success for a Critical Transition to Peace 
 
Within the turmoil, the success of a peace agreement seems even more distant, yet 
this turmoil also demonstrates the cry for change, the cry for peace, and the cry for the a 
success at Havana.  A successful peace agreement in Havana will restore societal trust, 
will set the precedent for any future peace agreements with other insurgency groups, like 
the ELN, and will ultimately determine the way in which the post conflict policies will 
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materialize.  A cooperation-cooperation scenario in the peace agreement prisoner’s 
dilemma will in turn increase the possibilities of having a cooperation-cooperation 
scenario for reintegration.  If both the government and the FARC cooperate and agree to 
peace, both the receiving communities and the ex-combatants will be more willing to 
cooperate in their own prisoner’s dilemma.  The receiving communities will be more 
trusting of ex-combatants who belong to a group that has ceased to be a threat of violence 
to the state and has agreed to collectively demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate; the ex-
combatants will be more willing to cooperate if they belong to a group that is no longer 
active and no longer poses a threat to their desertion and reintegration into civil 
society.  Delineating an actual end is key for ex-combatants to be able to undergo the 
reintegration process.  Albeit a success in Havana does not mean peace, it is one step 
closer to bridging the gap between a state of pre-post-conflict and one of post-
conflict.  The cessation of violence with the FARC assures that the policies of DDR with 
this armed group will be able to be implemented and enforced in a more realistic 
manner.  And perhaps, it will unify the country once more
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
 
The incertitude of the peace processes amidst political and social turbulence in 
Colombia undoubtedly will affect the implementation of DDR measures.  Colombia is a 
unique case of DDR because it is not in a true post-conflict state, but rather in a pre-post-
conflict state.  A clear-cut armistice that, would usually indicate the entrance into a state 
of post-conflict, will not be what propels the DDR processes in Colombia.  DDR has 
already been initiated and will continue to be implemented regardless of whether violence 
continues.  The definite end of violence in Colombia is unknown.  Yet, through an 
examination of the fifty-year war in Colombia and the elusive attempts at peace, the need 
for DDR processes is clear.  These processes must be employed to ensure that the return 
of ex-combatants into society will not engender new conflicts, so that a long-lasting 
peace can be a future possibility.   
Within the DDR processes, reintegration is the most complex step because it 
involves cooperation from multiple segments of society.  It is also the key step to secure a 
positive peace, as a successful reintegration process will guarantee that violence becomes 
an unthinkable method with which to pursue politics, as ex-combatants, victims, and 
receiving communities will have to work together for peacebuilding.  Since the success of 
the reintegration process is contingent on the cooperation of individuals at different levels 
of society, it is also the most difficult step because politics will have an effect on the 
success of the policy implementation.   
Considering the current situation in Colombia—a peace agreement whose 
completion is uncertain, the announcement of a second peace agreement with another 
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armed group, corruption scandals, a faltering economy, and policies of post-conflict 
within a context of ongoing violence and public distrust of government—two scenarios 
for the future can be imagined: a negative scenario where prospects for peace become 
more distant   and a positive scenario where people will  insist on an end to violence and 
achieve incremental steps toward domestic peace.   
 
I. Least positive scenario: Peace is not imminent 
 
Today, worrisome signs include continued violence from insurgent groups and 
increased coca production.  Despite any possible post-conflict attempt, the nation remains 
ridden with violence:  insurgencies and organized crime threaten the national security and 
continue to perpetrate acts of terrorism, massacres, forced displacement, environmental 
harm, sexual violence, child soldier recruitment and other crimes against humanity  
(Matta 2016).  These continuing violent structures impact the public’s belief in a peace or 
post-conflict.  The main active insurgency groups that add to the ongoing conflict are the 
ELN, the EPL group, and bands like “los Urabeños,” “Bloque Meta,” and “Libertadores 
del Vichada,” all of which add up to 3,580 combatants and together operate in 70% of the 
country.3  In urban areas, there are 1,883 bands of organized crime dedicated to extortion, 
selective killings, drug and arms trafficking, illegal mining, and larceny (Matta 2016).   
The cultivation of illicit drugs has fueled the armed conflict. According to the 
White House, Colombia’s coca production has increased, instead of having decreased as 
was expected because of a supposedly imminent peace agreement.  Since the start of the 
																																																								3	Even if they agreed in March 30 to officially start peace talks, they had continued their 
regular attacks against the military and the police on a regular basis until weeks before 
the announcement.	
Pico 73 
peace negotiation in 2012, the cultivation of coca has risen from 78,000 to 159,000 
hectares in 2015.  This is close to the coca cultivation levels in the early 2000s, when the 
FARC was at its peak military strength and when Colombia was said to be nearing the 
status of a failed state (The White House n.d.).  During this time, when President Pastrana 
was attempting peace talks with the FARC, the flow of drug income strengthened the 
FARC and they “made almost no effort to seriously negotiate a peace treaty” (Otis 2014). 
The current surge in coca production has given the country once more the number 
one position for coca production while peace is being discussed in Havana.   According 
to Colombian and U.S. officials, the FARC and other armed groups have been 
encouraging farmers “to plant more coca in anticipation of the peace deal and the new 
government aid” (Miroff 2015).  It is counterintuitive for a group who is expecting to 
sign a peace negotiation and enter civil life to increase the cultivation of coca.  By using 
the ceasefire agreed to in the negotiations to solidify and build up their finances, the 
FARC could use the increased coca production to revive the drug trade, regain strength 
and start “a new chapter in the 50-year conflict” (McDermott 2015).  It would seem that 
the FARC is betting on the failure of the peace process.  Taking advantage of a ceasefire, 
the end of aerial sprays, and the country’s attention in Havana, they could be using the 
peace negotiations as an opportunity to amass one of their most powerful weapons—
coca.  In fact, according to Insight Crime, the FARC controls about 60% of the coca 
fields in Colombia and could be said to earn well over $200 million dollars per year from 
a mix of coca production and selling activities (Otis 2014)   
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These threats to security, the continued violence and the increase in coca 
cultivation, discourage any positive outlook on the presidency.  The de-legitimization of 
Santos and his peace policies could continue, greatly affecting the attempts at post-
conflict policies.  The protests of April 2nd could be just the beginning of an intense 
social division, as a continuation of uprisings could further polarize and politicize the 
public into definite Uribista and Santista camps.  However, Santos will most likely not 
step down from his presidency, even if it is something that the public has demanded.  
Throughout the history of Colombia, despite the violence, presidential succession has 
been democratic and peaceful.  Institutions of civilian government have endured and 
retained legitimacy.  Yet, a continuation of public discord, economic turbulence, and 
political disagreements could destabilize government and social structures even further, 
worsening the conditions for peace and making cooperation from any segment of society 
even more difficult to incentivize.  A divided and disillusioned society facing chaos and 
violence might threaten these pillars of stability.  In an extreme case, it could offer a 
window for the rise of an autocratic and charismatic leader.  Until now, the military 
continues to favor the presidency and institutional channels of political contestation, so 
the possibilities for a military coup would be low (Interview with J.C. Gomez).  In a 
worst case scenario, the latest peace negotiations would become another instance of 
renewed violence, a failed peace on a long road toward an elusive peace that Colombians 
know so well.   
II. A brighter scenario: Peace is possible in increments 
 
 
 Ideally, peace would be achieved by a government-FARC agreement at the 
Havana talks in 2016.  With the renewed support of the United States, as illustrated by 
Pico 75 
the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry with Timochenko and its pledge 
to give $450 million dollars to the plan “Paz Colombia,” for the necessary investments in 
the post-conflict process, the peace negotiation could have been strengthened and steered 
towards completion (EFE 2016).  In this scenario, peace is achieved through a successful 
top-down approach.   
Nevertheless, taking into account the turbulence in current politics and events and 
the shaky state of negotiations in Havana, a more realistic possibility is for peace to 
originate from outside elite politics, from bottom-up enclaves of peace-building.  
 After a chaotic start of 2016 and an unpromising government-mandated solution 
to peace, the best prospects for peace are islands of reconciliation that are built and 
maintained by civil society.  Despite the fact that violence and corruption have been 
deafening forces in Colombian life, multiple people are committed to peace and post-
conflict processes—throughout society, enclaves of people who want to pull the country 
out of this void of conflict have been and will continue to work for peace.  After all, the 
perpetrators of violence are a small percentage of the overall Colombian population and 
do not reflect the strong desire for peace found within the consciousness of society. 
 The efforts of people committed to peace are reflected in the work of NGOs 
dedicated to the day-to-day and territorial facets of post-conflict.  These Colombians 
work towards a vision of peace, which is only attainable through post-conflict work.  
Colombia might not have a concrete end of the conflict, but post-conflict efforts must be 
implemented because a post-conflict is the every-day reality of certain individuals and 
communities.   
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 Organizations like Organizacion de Paz Territorial and Asociación de Víctimas de 
Minas y Munición sin Explotar del municipio de Barrancabermeja (AVICMAP) are 
working in the Magdalena Medio region in Colombia to address the needs in their 
communities, support all levels of society, and foment a vision of peace.  Their efforts to 
peace in this region are commendable.  Magdalena Medio is a volatile area, home to the 
largest oil refinery in the country and at the crossroads of numerous conflicts and 
massacres.  It also borders a jungle zone that has a high concentration of guerrilla and 
paramilitary zones.  Tensions between victims and ex-combatants and high social 
mobilization are the common reality.  The co-president of Organización de Paz 
Territorial, the President of AVICMAP, and the coordinator of AVICMAP proposed 
various arguments for the success of a peace process.  By compiling their responses, 
various points of peace can be made:  The multiple levels of society must be involved, all 
segments of society are equally responsible for peace without a victim and victimizer 
dichotomy, and the development of peace should be contextualized depending on the 
region. 
(1) The multiple levels segments of society must be involved: Whether directly or 
indirectly involved in the conflict, the success of a peace process would be in involving 
all sectors and levels of society; the failure would be in excluding certain sectors, like 
other armed groups who would gain strength if ignored.  The model of peace that is 
created at a national level must be taken to all levels and must be an agreement developed 
with everyone in mind—an agreement that clearly specifies the actions of all segments of 
society, an agreement for everyone. 
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(2) All segments of society are equally responsible for peace without a victim and 
victimizer dichotomy: The co-president of the Organización de Paz Territorial 
emphasized that his organization does not distinguish, nor does it create social 
differences among the different groups in the conflict.  In a peace process neither the 
victims nor the victimizers are the principal actors of the conflict, every citizen is equally 
responsible and should be equally involved.  A model of peace dichotomized between 
victims and victimizers cannot be constructed because one is an actor of power and the 
other does not have any incidence in politics of the state.  A dichotomy also takes away 
the responsibility that all segments of society have in building a new Colombia, creating 
a sentiment of indifference from other parties.    
(3) The development of peace should be contextualized depending on the region:  
Parallel and simultaneous processes to the national level peace negotiations need to be 
developed.  The conflict has engendered specific socioeconomic fractures in each region 
and territory and those specific fractures have in turn created different conflicts.  Because 
of this, peace processes that take into account the unique problems of each region need to 
be prioritized.  National peace will be possible through the concretization of territorial 
peace.  It will be a holistic national process, one where the national peace will be possible 
through territorial peace.    This is part of the success of peace, linking the national level 
with the territorial level.  It will fail to the contrary.   
   The efforts of these NGOs offer hope.  Individuals at the community level are 
mobilizing and are betting on peace.  Their statements also offer multiple lessons for the 
implementation of peace and post-conflict policies: Individuals at the community level 
(bottom level) are better equipped to address the needs of their community and spearhead 
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supportive measures conducive to peace, and since the community members and the ex-
combatants are the ones who actually live the post-conflict, they are the ones who have it 
in their best interest to cooperate in their individual Prisoner’s Dilemmas, meaning that 
cooperation is more effective if it starts at the bottom level. 
 
III. Recommendations 
 
Bottom-Top approach to post-conflict  
To recapitulate, peace needs to start at the bottom level.  The progress achieved in 
one region could be imitated by neighboring regions.  From archipelagos of peaceful 
coexistence, we can hope to achieve a national-level peace—a bottom-top approach to 
peace.  Ultimately, it is at the community and territorial level where strength and 
commitment to peace originates.  DDR processes will function more effectively if they 
are focused on this level.  
 
Education 
 The social paradigm of violence needs to be changed to one of peace, 
cooperation, and reconciliation.  This change starts with the younger generations, as they 
are the ones who can carry a new narrative of hope and strength into the imaginary of a 
future Colombia, they are the ones who will hopefully see a real peace starting to 
materialize in their lifetimes and who will carry out the DDR processes into posterity.    
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The power of forgiveness and reconciliation 
 The moral cost of DDR and peace comes from the moral trade-off of the victims, 
who have to jeopardize their dignity and sanity by accepting a margin of impunity and by 
living alongside people who might have displaced them or even murdered their families.  
Looking at other post-conflict processes like the one in Rwanda, we can learn about 
achieving social harmony through forgiveness and reconciliation.  Immaculée Ilibagiza 
was a victim of the Rwandan genocide, the sole survivor of her family, who found her 
family’s killers and forgave them.  Her message of forgiveness and reconciliation has 
made her an important speaker of faith, hope and forgiveness around the world.  In an 
interview with the Colombian newspaper El Espectador, she was asked whether she 
thought that Colombian victims could forgive after a war that has lasted more than half a 
century. She responded:  
 
What I can say is that if I was able to forgive, everyone can do it.  Even though 
violence has left wounds and hate, life always improves.  Pain and hate must be 
healed, because they don’t leave us anything if they aren’t.  And we will always 
find good reasons to find forgiveness: I wanted a future, do something good, and 
so I made everything change.  Forgiveness is a choice, is leaving behind that 
anger and transforming it into something positive. What I tell Colombians is that 
you yourselves have to find that forgiveness, because only you can understand the 
pain that you have suffered…I have prayed for the victimizers because at the end 
they are also victims.  We do not have to compete with evil…[and] we have to 
talk about what happened so that it is not repeated.  In my country, we understand 
that nothing is gained by hurting others, that war only produces madness and hate, 
which is an interminable chain.   
 
 
The power of forgiveness is stronger than a history of hate and violence.  Life 
continues and regardless of what has occurred in the past, a future will always come.  
Immaculée Ilibagiza is an inspiring life example of this, demonstrating that the path to 
peace lies in acceptance, reconciliation and forgiveness.  We can look to other countries 
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and other individuals to learn from their successes of transitional justice and their coping 
mechanisms to move forwards—ultimately, moving forward is all we can do.  We cannot 
change the past.  Colombia’s history is already stained.  But Colombia can hope to 
change the future in the decisions that individuals take to leave a painful past behind and 
pursue a life of dignity and inner peace. 
 
Unity 
The polarization that has characterized Colombian politics is unfortunate for any 
post-conflict or hopes of a peace process.  Colombians can only hope to achieve peace 
through DDR processes if they are unified.  National unity must be emphasized.  Peace 
will never be achieved within a polarized nation.  Polarization leads to the politicization 
of interests and it detracts from the ultimate goal of peace.  All segments of society have 
a right to peace, but they also have a duty to build it—corresponsibility will close the gap 
between peace and justice.  But, all segments must work together and leave politics 
behind.  Peace is not a political party.  Politicization initiates conflict.  
 
Changing the structure of society  
 The structure of Colombian society is at the root of the conflict in Colombia.  
Nevertheless the conflict has halted social development.  The war has prevented the 
nation from developing its social, economic, and infrastructure potential.  In other words, 
the conflict and the social structure have been mutually related in endogeneity, where one 
has impeded the other one from improving and vice versa.  If Colombia hopes to attain 
peace, the structural issues must be addressed as part of a peace process and DDR.  Post-
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conflict policies will not thrive inasmuch as there is still corruption and social structure 
issues in Colombia.  Yet again, without a peaceful atmosphere, it is challenging to focus 
and address issues like corruption, social inequality, and unequal land distribution, so 
achieving peace is prioritized and structural issues are set aside.  This seems to be the 
current political and social situation in Colombia—a situation detrimental to the peace 
efforts, as a structural crumbling has led to division and mistrust.  And, as previously 
mentioned, unity and support are indispensible for peace.  What is the order of priorities?  
Peace then structure? Or structure and then peace?  The complexity of the conflict leads 
us to believe that they must be addressed in a parallel way.  The current social 
momentum and discontent in the country’s politics must be turned into a positive force, 
peaceful social mobilization, to change the norms of corruption, inequality, and violence.  
Initiatives for social and structural change need to be linked to initiatives for peace and 
post-conflict resolution.  As evidenced by the efforts of the NGOs in Magdalena Medio, 
individual communities are spearheading organizations for change.  Social institutions 
and non-government organizations, regardless of the conflict, have continued to function 
in Colombia.   
This latest agreement might be part of another failed agreement, but it should not 
be archived in the long list of failures in Colombian politics.  Colombians want peace.  
Colombians will not tolerate further corruption and scandals.  We need to take advantage 
of this window in Colombia’s history, of the volatile and forceful impetus for change.  
Because of the endogenous nature of the conflict and the lack of structure, both must be 
simultaneously addressed, which can only be possible with the corresponsibility and the 
peaceful mobilization of every segment of society. 
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Focusing on the progress 
 The conflict in Colombia seems endless, but Colombia is not in a hopeless 
situation.  We must focus on the progress that has been achieved to propel future actions 
and decisions.  First of all, in terms of domestic affairs, Colombia is an example of 
urbanism: its capital and its second largest city, Bogota and Medellin, are success stories.  
Urbanism has been a form of social justice that has allowed these cities to prosper despite 
of violence.   
Home to Pablo Escobar, Medellin was once known as the murder capital of the 
world.  Since 1991, the murder rate has fallen by more than 80% (Bowater 2015).  
Medellin is now one of Colombia’s main cultural centers, as well as an international 
example of innovation and social projects.  Social programs, participatory budgets, and 
transport and education projects have transformed the lives of the most disadvantaged 
citizens in Medellin.  Medellin not only hosted UN Habitat's World Urban Forum in 
2014, but it has also won international recognition, such as being part of the top thirty-
three cities of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities project (Brodzinsky 
2014).  The city of eternal spring is an example of how social reform and restructuring 
can occur while addressing security issues.   
 Bogota is an example of sustainable transportation.  The transport efficiency has 
enabled greater social integration, linking the southern poorer areas to the rest of the city.  
Bogota has more than 186 miles of bicycle lanes extending from the capital center to the 
slums and the suburbs (Dac&Cities 2014).  The implementation of the TransMilenio 
affordable rapid bus system has revolutionized the mass transit system in Bogota, and “it 
is a particularly successful and applicable model in developing cities where 
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municipalities have finite resources and face numerous challenges” (Hutchinson 2011).   
This bus system model has been implemented in more than 100 cities around the world.  
On Sundays, Bogota is car free and uses public streets as a large public park with free 
activities, incentivizing families to attend (Dac&Cities 2014).   
   Taking the urban successes of Medellin and Bogota gives a better perspective of 
Colombia’s capabilities in terms of infrastructure. Yes, Colombia has a lack of 
infrastructure; yes, it has corruption within its various levels of governance; yes, it has 
networks of violence within its urban and rural areas.  But, violence has not destroyed 
innovation.  Innovation gives hope.  Colombia has been able to restructure its cities while 
coping with a civil war.  It is possible for Colombia to move forward and simultaneously 
build its social structure while engaging in peace building.  Colombia is not yet a failed 
state.   
In terms of foreign policy, Colombia has been a regional leader, always 
promoting democracy and peaceful accords.  According to the Country Study Handbook 
on Colombia published by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 
“Colombia's approach to security issues has been characterized by a willingness to settle 
disputes peacefully through recourse to international law and regional and international 
security organizations” (Hanratty 1990).   This approach continues to this day.  Colombia 
has been an active member in the United Nations since it was founded and it has been a 
leader in the Organization of American States (OAS), promoting the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts in states like El Salvador.     
With regard to its acrimonious relationship with its neighbor Venezuela, 
Colombia has opted for diplomatic solutions.  Six years ago, when both countries were on 
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the brink of war—as Colombia presented proof of guerrilla presence in Venezuelan 
territory to the OAS and Chavez moved military troops to the border after breaking 
relations with Colombia—President Santos met with President Chavez to agree to resolve 
their problems through diplomacy rather than through violence (Reyes 2015).  In the fall 
of 2015 another border turmoil between Venezuela and Colombia threatened to embroil 
both sides in military conflict: After Venezuela blamed smuggling for chronic gasoline 
and food shortage in the country, it closed the border crossings, forced 1,500 Colombians 
from their homes and caused about 20,000 Colombians to flee Venezuela through river 
borders.  However, both presidents reached a diplomatic agreement and decided to 
gradually normalize relations by reopening border crossings and reinstating national 
ambassadors in each country (Spear 2015).  Colombia’s effort to conflict resolution 
through diplomacy is commendable because it establishes Colombia’s efforts in 
maintaining regional peace. 
In terms of DDR, as mentioned in the first chapter, it must be reiterated that 
Colombia is a world leader, seeking to establish a collaborative network with different 
actors, nations and transnational organizations and agencies, who work in post-conflict 
and peacebuilding efforts (Interview with Alejandro Eder).  Colombia is seeking to 
exchange experiences with other nations, setting an example and a precedent of moving 
forward as an international community towards a future where members will use other’s 
failures and successes to improve the road to internal peaceful coexistence.  In this way, 
peacebuilding processes worldwide will be more effective and efficient.  
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IV. Final Remarks 
The research in this thesis points to four main conclusions:    
• A DDR process is the key to a transition to peace. 
•  The ‘R’ of DDR, Reintegration, is the most difficult and most important, as it 
involves the cooperation from all segments of society and it is the key to a long-
lasting peace.   
• To be successfully implemented, DDR processes must take into account the politics 
of the country. 
• Whether the peace attempt with the FARC is yet another elusive attempt at peace or 
whether it is the initiator to a road of peace, Colombia has been able and will be able 
to achieve peace through its archipelagos of peace at a community level. 
 
Colombians are all victims of a narrative of non-inclusion and disregard for life.  
This narrative is the past.  The present offers the opportunity to start a new narrative of 
inclusion and unity, where life is an incentive to move forward and to continue to 
survive.  As Gabriel Garcia Marquez said, “La vida no es sino una continua sucesión de 
oportunidades para sobrevivir.”  Colombia, the resilient survivor.  
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